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Human Rights and the Elusive Universal
Subject: Immigration Detention Under
International Human Rights and EU Law
CATHRYN COSTELLO*
ABSTRACT
The right to liberty is ubiquitous in human rights instruments, in
essence protecting all individuals from arbitrary arrest and detention.
Yet, in practice, immigration detention is increasingly routine, even
automatic, across Europe. Asylum seekers in particular have been
targeted for detention. While international human rights law limits
detention, its protections against immigration detention are weaker than
in other contexts, as the state's immigration control prerogatives are
given sway. In spite of the overlapping authority of international and
regional human rights bodies, the caselaw in this field is diverse.
Focusing on the U.N. Human Rights Committee, the European Court of
Human Rights, and the Court of Justice of the European Union, this
Article explores how greater interaction between these bodies could
produce more rights-protective standards.
INTRODUCTION
The right to liberty is ubiquitous in human rights instruments, in
essence protecting all individuals from arbitrary arrest and
detention. It should go without saying that deprivations of liberty
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require the strongest possible justification. Yet, in practice,
immigration detention' is increasingly routine, even automatic,
across Europe. 2 Often detention is justified on the basis that
categories of immigrants are "illegal," either in entering a state's
territory without authorization or in staying after they have been
told to leave. Asylum seekers in particular have been targeted for
detention.3 While international human rights law (IHRL)4 limits
detention, we see that the protections afforded to migrants are often
weaker than in other contexts.5 The state's migration control powers
seem to be given greater sway than others, reflecting an uneasy
1. "Immigration detention" is understood as referring to the detention of migrants (in
the broadest sense, to include all individuals entering the territory of a state other than
their own, be it as refugees, asylum-seekers, stateless persons, irregular migrants, or
regular migrants) either upon seeking entry to a territory or pending deportation,
removal, or return from a territory.
2. See generally COUNCIL OF EuR., PARL. Ass., Report of the Comm. on Migration,
Refugees and Population on the Detention of Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants in
Europe, Doc. No. 12105 (2010); ANA CATARINA MENDONCA, Explanatory Memorandum to
THE DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS AND IRREGULAR MIGRANTS IN EUROPE (2010);
MICHAEL FLYNN & CECILIA CANNON, GLOBAL DETENTION PROJECT, DETENTION AT THE
BORDERS OF EUROPE: REPORT ON THE JOINT GLOBAL DETENTION PROJECT-
INTERNATIONAL DETENTION COALITION WORKSHOP IN GENEVA, SWITZERLAND, 2-3
OCTOBER 2010 (2010).
3. See generally Michael Welsh & Liza Schuster, Detention of Asylum Seekers in the
US, UK, France, Germany and Italy: A Critical View of the Globalizing Culture of Control,
5 CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 331 (2005).
4. "International human rights law" is used here to connote the broad body of
international law that is rooted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
and the two key covenants: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR). It also includes the regional human rights instruments, in the European
context being those of the Council of Europe, principally the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Social Charters (ESC). For present purposes, I
focus on the ICCPR and ECHR. Also pertinent is the Refugee Convention (RC) (Geneva
Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of
refugees). The RC may not, on one view, be part of IHRL, because its main function is
palliative, in that it only applies when flight to another country triggers its legal
protections. However, I include it within the notion of IHRL here as the key instrument
that sets out the rights and obligations of states towards a vulnerable category of
foreigners, namely asylum seekers and refugees. Space precludes considering detention of
children, so for that reason alone the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is not
examined.
5. See generally ALICE .EDWARDS, BACK TO BASICS: THE RIGHT TO LIBERTY AND
SECURITY OF PERSON AND 'ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION' OF REFUGEES, ASYLUM-SEEKERS,
STATELESS PERSONS AND OTHER MIGRANTS (2011); INVL DETENTION COAL., LEGAL
FRAMEWORK AND STANDARDS RELATING TO THE DETENTION OF REFUGEES, ASYLUM
SEEKERS AND MIGRANTS: A GUIDE (2011); INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, MIGRATION AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: PRACTITIONERS GUIDE No. 6, at 147-90 (2011).
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tension between the universal right to liberty and the state's border
control prerogatives. My starting point is the acknowledgment of this
tension. I set out to examine how it is resolved over time when
migrants challenge their detention before human rights courts and
bodies.6
Accordingly, this Article focuses in particular on the roles of the
U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC), the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR or Strasbourg), and the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU or Luxembourg) in this context. The HRC is
the monitoring body for the International Covenant for Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), while the ECtHR is the court that enforces
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The CJEU is the
main court of EU law. Since 1997, the EU Member States have
conferred competence on the European Union (EU) to adopt binding
laws relating to immigration, asylum, and "combating illegal
immigration" from outside the EU.7 Now, there is a significant body of
EU law governing immigration detention, in particular, the detention
of asylum seekers under the Procedures Directive (PD)8 and Reception
Conditions Directive (RCD) 9 and of those facing deportation under the
Returns Directive (RD).1o Thus, as of late, the CJEU has become part
6. The principal focus is on the permissibility of detention per se, rather than
procedural protections and detention conditions, although the latter also raise serious
human rights concerns, usually scrutinized under guarantees against inhuman and
degrading detention conditions. See, e.g., European Convention on Human Rights art. 3,
opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, C.E.T.S. no. 194. Particular concerns are also raised in
relation to the detention of children. See, e.g., Mayeka & Mitunga v. Belgium, App. No.
13178/03 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006) http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC
database" hyperlink; search "Application Number 13178/03"). As will be seen though, the
two issues are intertwined, as detention conditions do bear on the permissibility of
detention, in particular under the case law of the European Court of Human Rights,
discussed below at infra Part II.C.
7. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art.
79(1), May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 83) 47, 77 [hereinafter TFEU] (stating aims for the
development of an EU common immigration policy).
8. See Council Directive 2005/85/EC, On Minimum Standards on Procedures in
Member States for Granting and Withdrawing Refugee Status, 2005 O.J. (L326) 13
[hereinafter PD] (this directive is currently being revised, and the outcome of the reform
process is not yet clear). See also Amended Proposal for a Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council on Common Procedures for Granting and Withdrawing
International Protection Status, COM (2011) 319 final (June 1, 2011).
9. Council Directive 2003/9, Laying Down Minimum Standards for the Reception of
Asylum Seekers, 2003 O.J. (L31) 18 [hereinafter RCD] (this directive is being revised at
present). See Amended Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council Laying Down Standards for the Reception of Asylum Seekers, COM (2011) 320
final, (June 1, 2011).
10. See Directive 2008/18, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18
December 2008 on Common Standards and Procedures in Member States for
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of the apparatus of supranational human rights adjudication over the
bulk of immigration detention by EU Member States."
The main aim of this article is to analyze the jurisprudence of all
three bodies on immigration detention. In comparing and contrasting
their different jurisprudence, I illustrate how different human rights
bodies speak with different voices on detention, a phenomenon that
is at least in part explained by their different institutional contexts
and decisional autonomy.12 Given that the resultant human rights
standards overlap significantly, I urge greater mutual engagement
between regimes, so that a "constructive human rights pluralism"
might emerge, drawing on a thesis developed at length elsewhere.' 3
Constructive human rights pluralism describes the desirable mode of
interaction between human rights regimes, whereby each cultivates a
degree of openness to the others, while maintaining its own
integrity.14
Returning Illegally Staying Third-Country Nationals, 2008 O.J. (L 348) 98
[hereinafter RD].
11. This article focuses on the easy case where Member States implement these
directives in detaining third-country nationals (TCNs) and are therefore subject to EU
norms. It is also arguable that in other situations Member State detention practices may
fall within the scope of EU law, in particular if the detention practices derogate from other
EU norms.
12. Of course, the degree of decisional autonomy or "zone of discretion" (to use Sweet's
term) will only be a crude indicator. As he puts it,
Mapping a zone of discretion cannot tell us what constitutional courts
[a term he applies to the ECtHR, CJEU and WTO Appellate Body] will
actually do with their powers. The best we can do is to predict that,
given a steady case load, constitutional judges operating in a relatively
larger zone will come to exercise more influence over the evolution of
the polity than those operating in relatively smaller zones.
Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International Regimes 16 IND.
J. OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 621, 640-41 (2009).
13. Cathryn Costello, Destination Europe: Human Rights & Admissions to the EU's
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Jan. 14, 2010) (unpublished doctoral thesis in law,
University of Oxford) (on file with author). See Miguel Poiares Maduro, Interpreting
European Law: Judicial Adjudication in a Context of Constitutional Pluralism, 1 EUR. J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (2007). See also Miguel Poiares Maduro, Courts and Pluralism: Essay on a
Theory of Judicial Adjudication in the Context of Legal and Constitutional Pluralism, in
RULING THE WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 356 (Jeffrey Dunoff & Joel Trachtman eds., 2009).
14. This piece focuses on the interactions across key international and regional
regimes, rather than between the international and domestic. On the latter, see generally
Gerald L. Neuman, Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and Dissonance,
55 STAN. L. REv. 1863 (2003); Grdinne de Bdrea & Oliver Gerstenberg, The
Denationalization of Constitutional Law, 47 HARV. INTL L. J. 243 (2006); Anne-Marie
Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of International Law is Domestic (or, The
European Way of Law), 47 HARV. INTL L. J. 327 (2006).
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I. TOWARDS CONSTRUCTIVE HUMAN RIGHTS PLURALISM
A. Human Rights Between Universalism and Statism
Human rights tend to be conceived of as universal, in that they are
rights all people have simply in virtue of being human. That premise
sits uneasily with statist border control, which presupposes rights
enjoyed within bounded states that have a sovereign right to control
admissions. A distinctive conception of sovereignty dominates
immigration discourse and law, tending to equate sovereignty and
unfettered state discretion.15 I refer throughout to the "statist entry
control assumption" or, simply, the "statist assumption" to connote this
notion that states have a sovereign right to exclude aliens without
justification. Undoubtedly, this notion warrants challenge on ethical
grounds 6 and cries out for historical corrective.' 7 The statist
assumption seems out of place in an age of human rights and increasing
transnational economic and social interpenetration. Yet, in the
migration context, it remains stubbornly ingrained. 8
This statist assumption is reflected in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) and percolates through other instruments. The
UDHR speaks of "the right to a nationality" but not in the country of one's
residence or choosing. It affirms the right "to freedom of movement and
residence," but only "within the borders of each State," 9 and the "right to
leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country,"20 but
not to enter another. Article 14(1) of the UDHR enshrines the right to
seek, but not to be granted, asylum, stating "everyone has the right to
seek and to enjoy . . . asylum from persecution." The formulation was
controversial, reflecting states' unease at inclusion of a right to be granted
15. See generally GALINA CORNELISSE, IMMIGRATION DETENTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
RETHINKING TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY (2010) (arguing that it is a distinctively territorial
account that distorts human rights in the immigration field).
16. See generally Veit Bader, The Ethics of Immigration, 12 CONSTELLATIONS 331
(2005).
17. For critiques of the presentation of the statist assumption in light of the historical
development of public international law, see James A. R. Nafziger, The General Admission
of Aliens Under International Law, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 804 (1983); Satvinder S. Juss, Free
Movement and the World Order, 16 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 289 (2004).
18. See, e.g., CATHERINE DAUVERGNE, MAKING PEOPLE ILLEGAL: WHAT GLOBALIZATION
MEANS FOR MIGRATION AND LAw (2008); Catherine Dauvergne, Sovereignty, Migration
and the Rule of Law in Global Times, 67 MOD. L. REV. 588 (2004).
19. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 13(1), G.A. Res. 217(111) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
20. Id. art. 13(2).
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asylum, lest it create a subjective right to enter their territory.21 Broadly
speaking, both the ICCPR22 and the ECHR23 follow this pattern. Even the
Refugee Convention (RC) does not create a right of admission to the
territory per se.24 As Seyla Benhabib puts it, "a series of internal
contradictions between universal human rights and territorial
sovereignty are built into the logic of the most comprehensive
international law documents in our world."25
Scholars examining the tensions between human rights and border
control tend to fall within three broad categories. Yasemin Soysal
exemplifies the universal. She argues that the development of IHRL
marked a transition from nationality to humanity as the primary
reference for the enjoyment of rights, diminishing the distinction between
citizens and aliens. 26 On the other extreme, we find scholars who
emphasize the persistent significance of migration control and alienage
within IHRL.27 Rather than open up space to resolve tensions between
universal human rights and migration control, IHRL tends to reify this
conflict, supporting the statist assumption. In this vein, it has been
suggested that the international legal character of IHRL instruments tie
21. See Guy S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE McADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
358-61 (3d ed. 2007).
22. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976
[hereinafter ICCPR].
23. Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Securing Certain Rights and Freedoms Other than Those
Already Included in the Convention and in the First Protocol Thereto, art. 2, 3, Sept. 16,
1963, E.T.S. No. 46.
24. As Goodwin-Gill and McAdam put it, "[sitates were not prepared to include in the
[RC] any article on admission of refugees; non-refoulement in the sense of even a limited
obligation to allow entry may well have been seen as coming too close to the unwished-for
duty to grant asylum." GOODWIN-GILL & McADAM, supra note 21, at 206-07. See Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 18, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1,
12 (stating that, "The right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of
the [RC] and in accordance with the Treaty establishing the European Community")
[hereinafter EUCFR]. But see Maria-Teresa Gil-Bazo, The Charter of Fundamental Rights
of the European Union and the Right to be Granted Asylum in the Union's Law, 27
REFUGEE SURVEY Q. 33, 34 (2008) (arguing that EUCFR art. 18 indicates that, "the right
to be granted asylum has become a subjective right of individuals under the Union's legal
order').
25. SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS, AND CITIZENS 11
(2004).
26. See generally YASEMIN SOYSAL, LIMITs OF CITIZENSHIP MIGRANTS AND
POSTNATIONAL MEMBERSHIP IN EUROPE (1994).
27. See, e.g., Linda Bosniak, Universal Citizenship and the Problem of Alienage, 94 NW.
U. L. REV. 963 (2000).
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them to the state system. 28 Accordingly, norms that manifest state
sovereignty "alter and shape human rights provisions."29 This Article
locates itself on the more ambivalent middle terrain, inspired by the work
of Benhabib. She identifies the apparently "irresolvable contradiction"
between universal human rights and democratic self-determination. 30
Yet, while she accepts that this apparent contradiction cannot be
overcome, she argues that it can be mediated and mitigated through
"democratic iterations" including "jurisgenerative politics." 3' These are
the deliberative processes in which universalist rights claims are
contested and contextualized. 32 Courts are exemplars of "strong public
bodies"33 engaged in these processes, as are other human rights
adjudicatory bodies like the HRC. The ECtHR has unsettled statist
border control assumptions, albeit in tentative fashion. Relocating
matters of asylum and immigration into the EU realm is replete with
further transformative potential.
B. A Plurality of Overlapping Instruments and Institutions
Overlapping, even competing, human rights jurisdiction is the
institutional reality.34 The authority of the HRC and the ECtHR
overlap, as all Council of Europe members are also parties to the
ICCPR.35 Although the HRC may decline to hear complaints if the
28. See generally SALADIN MECKLED-GARCIA & BASAK rALI, Lost in Translation: The
Human Rights Ideal and International Human Rights Law, in THE LEGALIZATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW 11 (2006).
29. Id. at 16.
30. Id. at 19.
31. Id. at 176-81. See generally Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARv. L. REV. 4 (1983); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988).
32. See MECKLED-GARCIA & QALI, supra note 28, at 179. See also Seyla Benhabib,
Claiming Rights Across Borders: International Human Rights and Democratic
Sovereignty, 103 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 691 (2009).
33. MECKLED-GARCIA & QALI, supra note 28, at 179 (distinguishing between "strong"
public bodies like the legislature, judiciary, and executive, and "weak" publics of civil
society associations and the media). My account differs in that it focuses not so much on
domestic public bodies so much as international and supranational ones.
34. See generally Liora Lazarus, Cathryn Costello, Nazila Ghanea, and Katja Zeigler,
Study for Parliament on the Evolution of Fundamental Rights Charters and Case Law: A
Comparison of the United Nations, Council of Europe and European Union Systems of
Human Rights Protection, Directorate-General for Internal Policies (Feb. 2011), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies/download.do?language=en&file
=34751.
35. For a list of parties to the ICCPR, see Databases, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/PagesfViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=IV-
4&chapter-4&lang-en (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).
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matter is already before the ECtHR,36 it inevitably pronounces on issues
(if not individual complaints) that are also raised before the ECtHR
given that both instruments deal with similar civil and political rights.
All EU Member States are parties to the ECHR, and the EU itself is
about to accede.37 Pending accession, the EU institutions have
internalized ECHR standards, and the CJEU uses them to scrutinize
both the validity of EU acts3 8 and of pertinent national ones.39 The
ECtHR, for its part, has deferred to the autonomy of the EU system,
satisfied that the EU generally provides "equivalent protection" of
human rights.40 In order to rebut this presumption, applicants must
demonstrate "manifestly deficient" protection within the EU system. 41
Most EU law is implemented by the EU Member States, and provided
they exercise some discretion in so doing, they remain answerable
before the ECtHR for their actions. 42 When EU Member States detain
third-country national (TCN) migrants, they are increasingly within the
scope of EU law, giving the CJEU jurisdiction as well.
Four vivid illustrations of the overlapping Luxembourg/Strasbourg
jurisdictions are pertinent and current. First, the individual at the
center of the CJEU's first ruling on predeportation detention
(Kadzoev)43 still has a case pending before the ECtHR concerning the
36. Catherine Phuong, The Relationship Between the European Court of Human Rights
and the Human Rights Committee: Has the 'Same Matter' Already Been 'Examined?, 7(2)
HUM. RTs. L. REV. 385, 394 (2007).
37. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 6(2), Dec. 13, 2007,
2008 O.J. (C 115) 13, 19 (stating that, "The Union shall accede to the [ECHR]. Such
accession shall not affect the Union's competences as defined in the Treaties") [hereinafter
TEU]. See also Council of Europe Informal Group on Accession of the European Union to
the Convention, Final Version of the Draft Legal Instruments on the Accession of the
European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights (July 19, 2011), available
at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/cddh-ue/cddh-ue-documentsEN.asp;
Tobias Lock, EU Accession to the ECHR: Implications for Judicial Review in Strasbourg
35 EUR. L. REV. 777 (2010).
38. E.g., Case C-540/03, Parliament v. Council, 2006 E.C.R. 1-5769.
39. E.g., Case C-60/00, Carpenter v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 2002 E.C.R.
1-6279.
40. Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, 42 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 1, 46 (2005). See generally Cathryn Costello, The Bosphorus Ruling of the European
Court of Human Rights: Fundamental Rights and Blurred Boundaries in Europe, 6 HUM.
RTs. L. REV. 87 (2006); Tobias Lock, Beyond Bosphorus: the European Court of Human
Rights' Case Law on the Responsibility of Member States of International Organizations
Under the European Convention on Human Rights, 10 HUM. RTs. L. REV. 529 (2010)
(providing an account of the jurisprudential developments since the Bosphorus decision).
41. See Bosphorus, 42 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 46.
42. See M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece, App. No. 30696/09 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011),
http://www.echr.coe.intlechr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search
"Application Number 30696/09").
43. Case C-357/09 PPU, Kadzoev, 2009 E.C.R. 1-11189.
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lawfulness of his detention under the ECHR.44 Second, the CJEU's other
ruling on predeportation detention (El-Dridi)45 raises some similar
issues on the detention-deportation nexus, as were considered by the
ECtHR only weeks before in Mikolenko v. Estonia.46 Third, Strasbourg
recently ruled on the duties of EU Member States when transferring
asylum seekers under the EU's Dublin Regulation 7 in M.S.S. V.
Belgium & Greece.48 A case on similar issues has been argued before the
CJEU.49 Fourth, the most recent ECtHR case on detention of asylum
seekers, Lokpo & Tourd v. Hungary,50 concerned detention under
domestic legislation adopted to give effect to the EU PD.51 The
applicants in any of these cases could invoke the ICCPR, if not
domestically, then by complaining to the HRC about their treatment.
IHRL has a common metaframework in the UDHR.52 On this basis,
some cross-fertilization, perhaps even leading to an international jus
commune on human rights across various human rights instruments,
may be envisaged. Certainly, convergence across different human rights
instruments and bodies would seem to be desirable with a view to
ensuring coherence and equality.53 Such convergence raises fewer
difficult institutional questions than the integration of human rights
44. Kadzoev v. Bulgaria, App. No. 56437/07 Eur. Ct. H.R. (introduced Dec. 20, 2007
and communicated Feb. 2, 2009).
45. See Case C-61/11 PPU, Hassen El-Dridi alias Karim Soufi, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex
CELEX LEXIS 1027 (Apr. 28, 2011).
46. Mikolenko v. Estonia, App. No. 10664/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search
"Application Number 10664/05").
47. See Council Regulation 343/2003, Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for
Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an Asylum Application Lodged
in One of the Member States by a Third-Country National, 2003 O.J. (L 50) 1 (EC).
48. See M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece, App. No. 30696/09 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011),
http://www.echr.coe.intlechr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search
"Application Number 30696/09").
49. Press Release, Opinions of the Advocate General in Joined Cases C-411/10 N.S. v.
Secretary of State for the Home Dep't and C-493/10 M.E. and Others v. Refugee
Applications Commissioner and Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform (Sept. 22,
2011) [hereinafter Opinions of AG Trstenjak in NS/ME).
50. Lokpo & Tour6 v. Hungary, App. No. 10816/10 Eur. Ct. H. R. 7, para. 16 (2011),
http://www.echr.coe.intlechr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search
"Application Number 10816/10").
51. Id. para. 15.
52. See, OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 31-32 (2010)
("Whether they are adopted at the universal or the regional levels, all human rights
treaties are derived from the UDHR, from which they borrow, sometimes quite literally,
much of their language. It is therefore quite natural for international courts or quasi-
judicial bodies .. . to cite one another.").
53. This is not to suggest that convergence is in all cases desirable. Convergence at the
lowest common denominator is clearly undesirable.
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standards into other regimes, such as those dealing with international
trade or investment, where that integration may be seen to expand the
functional regime's scope.54 Indeed, the sort of mutual engagement
between overlapping human rights systems advocated here is much less
contentious than the citation of foreign law sources across constitutional
jurisdictions.65 While all three of the bodies under discussion here, the
HRC, the ECtHR, and the CJEU, are charged with enforcing a
particular instrument or body of law, they also have the means, and
indeed, the obligation, to take into account other instruments and
jurisprudence. For instance, the ECHR contains a provision referring to
obligations under other human rights instruments.56 Similarly, the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR), a binding part of EU law
since 2009, and the general principles of EU law, which contain binding
fundamental rights norms predating the Charter, are both synthetic in
character, drawing on outside human rights standards.57
For instruments with broader scope to influence the narrower
regional ones seems entirely fitting. In particular, it is legally and
institutionally problematic for the ECHR standards to fall below the
54. See Anne Van Aaken, Defragmentation of Public International Law Through
Interpretation: A Methodological Proposal, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 483, 483
(2009).
55. See, e.g., Christopher McCrudden, Judicial Comparativism and Human Rights, in
COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK 371 (Esin Oriicii & David Nelken eds., 2007). As Waters
notes, much of the U.S. debate conflates the citation of "foreign" domestic sources and
international law. Melissa Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward
Interpretative Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 628 (2007).
56. The ECHR provides in Article 53 (ex Article 60), entitled "Safeguard for Existing
Human Rights," that "nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or
derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured
under the laws of any High Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a
Party." European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 6, art. 53.
57. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 6(1), 2007 O.J. (C 303)
1. The TEU now provides that, "The Union recognizes the rights, freedoms and principles
set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000,
as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as
the Treaties ... The Charter contains Article 53, entitled "Level of Protection," which
provides:
Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely
affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized, in
their respective fields of application, by Union law and international
law and by international agreements to which the Union or all the
Member States are party, including the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and by the
Member States' constitutions.
Id. Furthermore, Article 52(3) provides the EUCFR rights which "correspond" to ECHR
rights and shall have the same meaning and scope, although EU law may provide higher
protection. On this provision, see Opinions of AG Trstenjak in NS/ME, supra note 49, $1
142-48.
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ICCPR. The ICCPR embodies a global minimum; it is undesirable, not
only legally, but also institutionally, for a regional system to fall below
that standard. Individuals from regions with developed human rights
systems should not have to look to protection at the U.N. level. When
they do, it signals a double failure, at both the domestic and the regional
level. In contrast, for the narrower regional system to prompt
progressive developments in the broader one may raise objections from
the states that are not party to the narrower regional system.
Nonetheless, under certain conditions it may be appropriate. For
instance, EU standards may provide evidence for an evolving consensus
that the ECtHR should regard according to its own established
interpretative methodology.58 Also, there are means whereby the wider
system may reinforce the narrower one. For instance, the Strasbourg
Court sometimes takes into account Member States' obligations under
EU law in assessing states' limitation of certain rights,59 or even in
determining whether states meet their positive duties under absolute
guarantees such as Article 3 of the ECHR.60
This Article is also concerned with the particular legal position of
asylum seekers and refugees, so the RC is pertinent. This instrument
lacks a dedicated court or monitoring body.61 Given that absence,
asylum seekers and refugees in Europe often have recourse to the
ECtHR, as the Strasbourg system offers comparative enforcement
advantages over the RC.62 Over the years, Strasbourg has developed an
extensive jurisprudence on asylum seekers and refugees, taking into
account, but not enforcing, the RC.6 3 For instance, the ECtHR in Amuur
58. See, Camille Dautricourt, A Strasbourg Perspective on the Autonomous Development
of Fundamental Rights in EU Law: Trends and Implications (Jean Monnet Working Paper
No. 10/10, 2010), available at http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers/10/101001.html,
30-35.
59. Mendizabal v. France, App. No. 51431/99 Eur. Ct. H. R. (2006), http://www.echr.coe.int/
echr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search "Application Number 51431/99").
See also the varying examples in Dautricourt, supra note 58, at 36-39.
60. Thus, controversially, in M.S.S v. Belgium & Greece the ECtHR had regard to
Greece's obligations under the EU RCD to assess whether its treatment of asylum seekers
was "inhumane and degrading" contrary to Article 3 ECHR. See, M.S.S. v. Belgium &
Greece, App. No. 30696/09 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011), http://www.echr.coe.intlechr/en/hudoc
(follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search "Application Number 30696/09").
61. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137
[hereinafter RC]. The RC states parties may, under Article 38, accord the ICJ jurisdiction
over the instrument. However, this jurisdiction has never been invoked, leading to what is
known as the "Article 38 deficit."
62. H6lbne Lambert, Protection Against Refoulement from Europe: Human Rights Law
Comes to the Rescue, 48 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 543 (1999).
63. See generally NUALA MOLE & CATHERINE MEREDITH, ASYLUM AND THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2010).
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v. France noted, but did not explore, the import of the RC on detention. 64
Similarly, the ECtHR protects many asylum seekers and refugees from
removal, bolstering and extending the RC's non-refoulement
guarantee.65 The EU, for its part, legislates on asylum and refugee
matters. In so doing, it is required to adopt measures which are "in
accordance with the [RC] and other relevant treaties."66 In legislating on
the scope of refugee protection in Europe, the EU codified not only the
RC concept of persecution "within the meaning of article 1A of the
[RC],"67 but also a broader notion of serious harm encompassing some of
the ECHR non-refoulement protection and some protection for those
fleeing indiscriminate violence.68
Notwithstanding IHRL's common basis in a set of metaprinciples,
and the appropriateness of cross-referencing between different systems,
the specter of a fragmentation of IHRL looms. While the ECtHR has
integrated various other human rights standards, it has done so in a
somewhat piecemeal and inconsistent way.69 The CJEU's use of sources
other than the ECHR has been "parsimonious."70 In particular, the
CJEU has been strikingly dismissive of the jurisprudence of quasi-
judicial bodies, including the HRC. It noted that the HRC is "not a
64. Amuur v. France, App. No. 19776/92 Eur. H.R. Rep. para 43 (1996).
Such confinement, accompanied by suitable safeguards for the persons
concerned, is acceptable only in order to enable States to prevent
unlawful immigration while complying with their international
obligations, particularly under the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees and the European Convention on Human
Rights. States' legitimate concern to foil the increasingly frequent
attempts to circumvent immigration restrictions must not deprive
asylum-seekers of the protection afforded by these conventions.
65. However, it has also been suggested that in demanding a high degree of
individuation of risk in order to trigger protection from removal, "the coexistence of the
two systems [RC and ECHR] appears to have aggravated the restrictive tendencies of
both-in other words, competition between the two systems has resulted in constraining
the protection opportunities of asylum seekers, instead of amplifying them, as it should."
Jean Frangois Durieux Salah Sheekh is a Refugee: New Insights into Primary and
Subsidiary Forms of Protection (Refugee Studies Centre Working, Paper No. 49, 2008).
66. See TFEU, supra note 7-the pertinent provision is now Article 78 (1).
67. Council Directive 2004/83, art. 9(1), On Minimum Standards for the Qualification
and Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons
Who Otherwise Need International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted,
2004 O.J. (L 304) 12 (QD).
68. See id., art. 15. See also Elgafaji v. Staatssecreteris van Justitie, App. No. 465/07
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), http://www.echr.coe.intlechr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database"
hyperlink; search "Application Number 465/07").
69. See generally MAGDALENA FOROwIcZ, THE RECEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2010).
70. Israel Jestis Butler & Olivier de Schutter, Binding the EU to International Human
Rights Law, 27 Y.B. OF EUR. L. 277, 282 (2008).
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judicial institution" and that its "findings [had] no binding force in
law."7 1 While it is appropriate for one body to take into account the
others' institutional context when reading its output, the CJEU position
is too dismissive. Its characterization of the HRC is certainly at odds
with the HRC's self-perception. 72 As will be seen, immigration detention
also is a domain where the appropriate constructive engagement is
lacking.
C. Contrasting Institutional Contexts
Although both the ECtHR and CJEU are evidently courts, their
institutional setup differs significantly. The ECtHR is accessible only
once domestic remedies have been exhausted. Nonetheless, it disposes of
a massive, growing caseload, acting as a supranational court for human
rights across the forty-seven countries of the Council of Europe. The
ECtHR is now inundated with cases, and reforms have been undertaken
to allow it to deem more cases inadmissible and dispose of cases more
efficiently. 73 Although the ECHR is under some accounts characterized
as a constitutional instrument,7 4 its domestic effect varies across
contracting states.75
The CJEU, in contrast, has jurisdiction over a range of different
actions against the EU institutions and the Member States, to ensure
compliance with the vast body of EU law, including treaties, legislation,
and general principles. Most of the CJEU's caseload comprises
references from national judges, often concerned (albeit indirectly) with
the compatibility of domestic laws and practices with EU norms. Unlike
the HRC and the ECtHR, the CJEU is not exclusively or even
predominantly a human rights court. Its human rights jurisdiction
arises where there are some pre-existing questions of EU law. EU
human rights norms then bind the EU institutions and the Member
States when they act within the scope of EU law. 76
71. Case C-249/96, Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd., 1998 E.C.R. 1-621, para. 46.
72. See generally infra notes 87-89.
73. COUNCIL OF EuR., PROTOCOL 14 THE REFORM OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS FACT SHEET, available at www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/57211BCC-C88A-43C6-
B540-AF0642E81D2C/O/CPProtocole 14EN.pdf.
74. See, e.g., Alec Stone Sweet, Sur la constitutionalisation de la Convention
europdenne des droits de lhomme conque comme une Cour constitutionnelle, 80 REVUE
TRIMESTRIELLE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 923 (2009).
75. For an overview, see generally, A EUROPE OF RIGHTS: THE IMPACT OF THE ECHR ON
NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS (Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2008).
76. The phrase "within the scope of EU law" is contentious. The binding EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights purports to bind the EU Member States only when they are
"implementing" EU law (Article 51(1) EUCFR); although it may be interpreted to
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In exercising their judicial review tasks, both courts must be
mindful of securing compliance with their rulings. In this endeavor,
Strasbourg is in a weaker position than Luxembourg, in that it lacks the
direct line of communication with national judges inherent in the
preliminary reference procedure, and it has a wider and more diverse
pool of states to keep in check. For Karen Alter, "[the CJEU] is about
the most powerful and influential international court that is
realistically possible."77 These institutional positions have led to
different approaches to the domestic status of EU and ECHR law. The
ECHR requires domestic incorporation,7 8 while the CJEU obliges
national judges to give EU law full effect, interpreting domestic law to
comply with EU law,79 and, if necessary, to set aside conflicting
domestic norms.80 Should the national court have any doubts as to the
meaning or effect of any particular EU provision, it may refer questions
to the CJEU.81
Contrasting domestic statuses both reflect and temper the courts'
respective jurisprudence on national remedies. The ECtHR's starting
point is that it is a subsidiary organ, and the primary guarantors of
ECHR rights are the Member States. In contrast, the CJEU stipulates
encompass the same scenarios as the broader phrase "within the scope of EU law." See
generally Dautricourt, supra note 58, at 49-51; Opinions of AG Trstenjak in NS/ME,
supra note 49.
77. Karen Alter, The European Court of Justice's Political Power Across Space and
Time 3 (Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 09-03, 2009).
78. See generally, Rick Lawson, The Monitoring of Fundamental Rights in the Union as
a Contribution to the European Legal Space (III): The Role of the European Court of
Human Rights (Reflexive Governance in the Pub. Interest, Working Paper No. REFGOV-
FR-7, 2006).
79. This doctrine of "indirect effect" has its origins in Case C-106/89, Marleasing SA v.
La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA, 1990 E.C.R. 1-4135. For an application in
the EU refugee law context, see C-465/07, Elgafaji v. Staatssecreteris van Justitie, 2009
E.C.R. 1-921.
80. See Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A.,
1978 E.C.R. 629. For an application in the context of immigration detention, see Case
C-61/11 PPU, Hassen El-Dridi alias Karim Soufi, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 1027
(Apr. 28, 2011).
81. Before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, under Article 68 EC only
national courts and tribunals "against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under
national law" were empowered to refer questions concerning EU asylum and immigration
law. See generally Steve Peers, EC Immigration Law and EC Association Agreements:
Fragmentation or Integration? 34 EUR. L. REv. 628 (2009). However, the Treaty of Lisbon
has removed this anomalous restriction so that all national courts and tribunals may
make such references. For the most part, whether to refer is in the discretion of the
national judge, although judges of final instance are obliged to refer questions of EU law,
which are necessary to resolve the case before them, unless the matter is already settled
and clear. Article 267 TFEU. Case 283/81, SrI CILFIT & Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v.
Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415.
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duties for national judges directly, reflecting their shared role as EU
law judges. As a result, the ECtHR case law on remedies is more
tentative than that of the CJEU. In particular, concerning migration
status, the ECtHR tends to leave states control over formal migration
status, even when it deems individuals to be nonremovable for human
rights reasons. 82 However, the CJEU does not hesitate in deeming that
EU law creates stable residence rights in other EU Member countries
for those who come within its scope. 83 The overall result is captured in
Virginie Guiraudon's stylized contrast between the CJEU and the
ECtHR. She posits a "bold [CJEUJ and a tamer [ECtHR]" and predicts
"that the [CJEU] will have less fear of increasing its competence and
[issuing] controversial rulings, while the [ECtHR] will adopt a self-
limiting approach to slowly gain legitimacy and avoid provoking nation-
states."84 We can see some hints of that prediction coming to pass in the
immigration detention case law.
The ICCPR's monitoring body, the HRC, has been empowered to
examine individual complaints since 1985.85 While its scrutiny of states'
regular reports forms the bulk of its work, it is becoming increasingly
court-like in its adjudication of individual grievances. 86 While initially it
was assumed that its decisions (known as views) in response to these
individual complaints were not legally binding as such, over time the
HRC has asserted that states do have an obligation to allow both views
and interim measures87 to take legal effect within their national legal
82. See, e.g., Bonger v. Netherlands, App. No. 10154/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search
"Application Number 10154/04").
83. See, e.g., Case 48/75, Joel Noel Royer, 1976 E.C.R. 497; Case C-60/00, Carpenter v.
Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 2002 E.C.R. 1-6279; Case C-127/08, Metock v. Minister
for Justice, Equal. & Law Reform 2008 E.C.R. 1-6241. Admittedly, these cases concern EU
Citizens and their TNC family members. However, where TCNs derive rights of residence
from other EU measures, we see similar approaches emerging. E.g., Case C-578/08,
Chakroun v. Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2010 E.C.R. 1-1839.
84. Virginie Guiraudon, European Courts and Foreigners'Rights: A Comparative Study
of Norm Diffusion, 34 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 1088, 1094 (2000).
85. See Liz Heffernan, A Comparative View of the Individual Petition Procedures under
the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 78 (1997); see generally Dominic McGoldrick, The
Human Rights Committee: Its Role in the Development of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (1991).
86. FOROWICZ, supra note 69, at 152-53.
87. See Weiss v. Austria, U.N. Human Rights Comm., 77th Sess., Comm. No. 1086/2002
at 1 11.1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/77/D/1086/2002 (May 24, 2002). The HRC decision was cited by
the ECtHR when it established an analogous principle in Mamatkulov v. Turkey, App. Nos.
46827/99 & 46951/99 Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 4, 2005, http://www.echr.coe.intlechr/en/hudoc
(follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search "Application Number 46827/99'. For
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order.88 The domestic effects of the ICCPR vary greatly in practice
though.89 The HRC may find violations and specify a particular remedy.
Compliance is then monitored through a process of periodic review.90
The institutional differences sketched in this part will illuminate the
substantive discussion in the next part.
II. IMMIGRATION DETENTION & HUMAN RIGHTS
Immigration detention is garnering increasing attention in
international human rights fora. Within the U.N. system, the Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD) has considered immigration
detention since 1997.91 The U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Human
Rights of Migrants92 and the U.N. High Commissioner for Human
Rights have also engaged with this issue.93 Within the Council of
Europe, the Committee of Ministers adopted the Twenty Guidelines on
Forced Return in 2005,94 while its Parliamentary Assembly adopted an
discussion of this development as a manifestation of the emerging jus commune of human
rights, see Butler & de Schutter, supra note 70, at 37-39.
88. Andr6 Nollkaemper & Rosanne Van Alebeek, The Legal Status of Decisions by
Human Rights Treaty Bodies in National Law 2 (Amsterdam Center for International
Law, Research Paper No. 2011-02, Apr. 11, 2011); Scott Davidson, Intention and Effect:
The Legal Status of the Final Views of the Human Rights Committee, 2001 N.Z. L. REV.
125, 131-32 (2001).
89. See Christopher Harland, The Status of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) in the Domestic Law of State Parties: An Initial Global Survey
Through UN Human Rights Committee Documents, 22 HuM. RTS. Q. 187, 189 (2000).
90. For a defense of this dialogic process, see Michael O'Flaherty, The Concluding
Observations of United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 6 HuM. RTs. L. REV. 27
(2006).
91. Human Rights Commission Res.1997/5 (15 Apr. 1997); UN Does. E/CN.4/1999/63
(1998), E/CN.4/2004/3 (2003), E/CN.4/2006/7 (2005), A/HRC/10/21 (2008), and
A/HRC/13/30 (2010). A specific recent report on Italy deals extensively with immigration
detention. See Report of the WGAD on its Mission to Italy, UN Does AIHRC/10/21/Add.5
(2009) [hereinafter Report of the WGAD].
92. Special Rapporteur on Migrant Workers, Report of the Special Rapporteur, Ms.
Gabriela Rodriguez Pizarro, U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, UN Doc. EICN.4/2003/85
(Dec. 30, 2002) (by Gabriela Rodriguez Pizarro); Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights
of Migrants, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, Human Rights Council,
UN Doc. A/HRC/11/7 (May 14, 2009) (by Jorge Bustamante).
93. See Immigration Control Must Not Compromise Human Rights, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED NATIONs HIGH COMM'R (Sept. 22, 2009), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NEWSEVENTS/
Pages/MigrationPanel.aspx.
94. COUNCIL OF EUR., COMM. OF MINISTERS, Twenty Guidelines on Forced Return,
925th Meeting of the Ministers' Deputies (May 4, 2005) [hereinafter Twenty Guidelines on
Forced Return]. The Parliamentary Assembly prompted the compilation of these
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important resolution and recommendation in early 2010 specifically on
immigration detention.95 Significantly, an UNHCR-OHCHR Global
Roundtable on Alternatives to Immigration Detention was held in May
2011 in Geneva.96 Additionally, the EU's Fundamental Rights Agency
(FRA) recently reported on preremoval detention.97 These political
initiatives, and the soft law principles espoused therein, form an
important backdrop to this article.
A. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
As discussed below, while one might expect the weak institutional
framework of the ICCPR to produce tentative rulings on immigration
detention, the HRC has developed a relatively robust line of
jurisprudence.98 Detention must be lawful and nonarbitrary in order to
meet the Article 9 standards.99 While the notion of lawfulness is similar
to that employed by the ECtHR, as will be seen, the HRC notion of
arbitrariness is thicker, connoting "elements of inappropriateness,
injustice and lack of predictability" as well as reasonableness and
necessity "in all the circumstances for a specific purpose."100 In this
context, the HRC also applies the principle of proportionality.101
Article 9 does not expressly limit the legitimate purposes of
detention, unlike Article 5 of the ECHR. However, the HRC has clarified
that detention must pursue a specific purpose. Crucially, for
immigration detention purposes, illegal entry alone does not justify
guidelines. EUR. PARL. Ass., Expulsion Procedures in Conformity with Human Rights and
Enforced with Respect for Safety and Dignity, 3d Sitting, Doc. No. 9196, (2002).
95. See EuR. PARL. Ass., The Detention of Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants in
Europe, Doc. No. 12105 (Jan. 11, 2010).
96. See U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees & U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights,
Concept Note on the Global Roundtable on Alternatives to Detention of Asylum-Seekers,
Refugees, Migrants and Stateless Persons (May 11-12, 2011), http://www.unher.org/
4dde23ab9.pdf.
97. See Fundamental Rights Agency, Detention of Third-Country Nationals in Return
Procedures, at 80-81 (2010), available at http://fra.europa.eulfraWebsite/research/
publications/publications per-year/pub detention-en.htm#.
98. For an extensive analysis, see generally CORNELISSE, supra note 15.
99. "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected
to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such
grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established by law." ICCPR, supra
note 22, at art. 9.1.
100. Human Rights Comm., van Alphen v. Netherlands, Commc'n No. 305/1988, 5.8,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/39/D/305/1988 (1990).
101. Human Rights Comm., A. v. Australia, Commc'n. No. 560/1993, 1 9.2, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (1997).
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detention.102 In this respect, the HRC has set a more demanding
standard than the ECtHR in its case law on "detention to prevent
unauthorised entry."103 The HRC demands that there are other
additional factors particular to the individual, "such as the likelihood of
absconding and lack of cooperation, which may justify detention for a
period." 104
Not only must detention pursue a narrow specific aim, it must be
necessary and proportionate in the individual circumstances.105 The
HRC repeatedly condemned Australia's detention practices for failure to
provide individual justifications.10 6 Detention may not be justified on
the basis of the country's "general experience that asylum seekers
abscond if not retained in custody," 0 7 an assumption that does not
appear grounded in empirical reality in any event.108 In C. v.
Australia,109 the HRC condemned a detention where the state had failed
to assess whether other means (such as the imposition of reporting
obligations, sureties, or other conditions) would have met the aim of
ensuring compliance with immigration law.110 In contrast, in Jalloh v.
Netherlands, the detention in question was found justified as the
applicant had previously fled an open facility."'
102. Id. para. 9.4.
103. See infra Part II.C.3.
104. Human Rights Comm., A. v. Australia, Commc'n. No. 560/1993, 9.4, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (1997).
105. Id. para. 9.2.
106. See generally id.; Human Rights Comm., Saed Shams v. Australia, Comm. No.
1225/2004, CCPR/C/90/D/1255 (2007); Human Rights Comm., D and E and Their Two
Children v. Australia, Comm. No. 1050/2002, CCPR/C/87/D/1050/2002 (2006); Human
Rights Comm., Shafiq v. Australia, Comm. No. 1324/2004, CCPRIC/88/D/1324/2004 (2006);
Human Rights Comm., Baban v. Australia, Comm. No. 1014/2001,
CCPR/C/78/D/1014/2001 (2003); Human Rights Comm., Bakhtiyari v. Australia, Comm.
No. 1069/2002, CCPR/C/79/D/1069/2002 (2003); Human Rights Comm., C. v. Australia,
Comm. No. 900/1999, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/76/D/900/1999 (2002). In spite of these views,
Australia continues its practice of automatic detention. See Australian Human Rights
Comm., Submission to the Joint Select Committee on Australia's Immigration Detention
Network 11-27 (Aug. 2011), http://www.hreoc.gov.aullegallsubmissions/2011/
201108_immigration.html.
107. Human Rights Comm., Shafiq v. Australia, Commc'n No. 1324/2004, 1 7.3, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/88/D/1324/2004 (2006).
108. See Office of the United Nations High Comm'r, Alternatives to Detention of Asylum
Seekers and Refugees, (Apr. 2006), www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4472e8b84.pdf (Ophelia
Field & Alice Edwards).
109. Human Rights Comm., C. v. Australia, Commc'n No. 900/1999, 1. 8.2, U.N. Doc.
CCPRIC/76/D/900/1999 (2002).
110. Id.
111. Human Rights Comm., Jalloh v. Netherlands, Commc'n. No. 794/1998, 8.2, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/74/D/794/1998 (2002).
274
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ELUSIVE UNIVERSAL SUBJECT
B. Refugee Convention
The RC establishes a spectrum of rights allocated according to the
degree of attachment between the refugee and the state in question."12
Article 26 on freedom of movement applies to those "lawfully in" the
territory.13 While Article 26 clearly applies to recognized refugees, there
is debate as to whether it applies to asylum seekers too. One view holds
that Article 26 should apply to asylum seekers whose applications have
been presented.114 In this view, then, asylum seekers should generally
enjoy a right to free movement once formally in the asylum process,
although their movement may be restricted under the same conditions as
are "applicable to aliens generally in the same circumstances.""i5 Notably,
several European governments still contest the applicability of Article 26
to asylum seekers.116 Such contestation reflects a more general
movement, whereby governments have distorted the scope of the RC, by
seeking to limit the rights attaching to the category of "asylum seeker." In
contrast, the RC is based on the premise that asylum seekers are
presumptive refugees, and to be treated accordingly, particularly in light
of the declaratory character of refugee status."17
Article 31, the nonpenalization clause, is concerned with those who
are illegally present in a state, provided that they "present themselves
without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal
entry or presence." They are to be immune from penalties and subject
only to such restrictions on free movement as are necessary. As to the
meaning of "penalties," while some take the view that only criminal
sanctions are precluded,"18 several authoritative commentators take the
112. Hathaway describes this as the "structure of entitlement" under the RC. JAMES C.
HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 154 (2005). See
GOODwIN-GILL, supra note 21, at 524-28, who described it as "criteria of entitlement."
113. The full text of the article states that "[elach Contracting State shall accord to
refugees lawfully in its territory the right to choose their place of residence to move freely
within its territory, subject to any regulations applicable to aliens generally in the same
circumstances." RC, supra note 61, art. 26.
114. See HATHAWAY, supra note 112, at 173, for extensive consideration of the meaning
of "lawful stay."
115. RC, supra note 61, art. 26.
116. See Reinhard Marx, Article 26 (Freedom of Movement/Libert de Circulation), in
THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL: A
COMMENTARY 1147, 1161-64 (Andreas Zimmermann et al. eds., 2011).
117. See Office of the United Nations High Comm'r, Handbook on Procedures and
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1 28, HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (1992) quoted in James
Hathaway, What's in a Label?, 5 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 1, 9-10 (2003).
118. Cornelisse simply asserts that "[i]t is not plausible that this provision would be
violated when a refugee is detained on account of his illegal entry, if the deprivation of
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view that at least some forms of detention should be precluded as
punitive.119 Alternatively, even if detention is not always regarded as a
"penalty," Article 31(2) provides that the asylum seeker may be
subjected only to such restrictions as are necessary.120
The UNHCR's Revised Guidelines on Detention of Asylum Seekers
confirm that "[a]s a general principle, asylum-seekers should not be
detained," and that detention is only permissible in exceptional
circumstances, when it is reasonable, proportional, and necessary in
order to attain a limited range of objectives.121 However the range of
purposes is broad, allowing detention in order:
To verify identity; to determine the elements on which
the claim to refugee status or asylum is based; to deal
with cases where refugees or asylum-seekers have
destroyed their travel andlor identity documents or have
used fraudulent documents in order to mislead the
authorities of the State in which they intend to claim
asylum; or to protect national security or public order.122
The breadth of the grounds seems liable to undermine the commitment
to ensuring that detention is an exceptional practice.
Regrettably, as Goodwin-Gill notes:
liberty is an administrative measure and is not categorized as a criminal sanction as
such." CORNELISSE, supra note 15, at 262. She assumes that only Article 31(2) limits
detention, requiring it to be "proportional in view of the individual circumstances of each
and every individual." Id.
119. Guy Goodwin-Gill, Article 31 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees: Non-penalization, Detention and Protection, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR's GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION
185, 195-96 (Erika Feller, Volker Trk & Frances Nicholson eds., 2003). See also
EDWARDS, supra note 5, at 11 (citing Gregor Noll, Article 31 (Refuges Unlawfully in the
Country of Refuget/Rgfugds en Situation Irrigulicre dans le Pays d'Accueil), in THE 1951
CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL: A
COMMENTARY 1243, 1263-64 (Andreas Zimmermann et al. eds., 2011)).
120. Hathaway explains the "strictly provisional" nature of the detention power under
Article 31(2), with Article 26 of the RC as the general provision applicable to most asylum
seekers who have been admitted to the asylum procedure. HATHAWAY, supra note 112, at
414, 418-19. Hathaway also discusses "necessity." Id. at 423-39.
121. Office of the United Nations High Comm'r for Refugees, UNHCR's Guidelines on
Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers 3, (Feb.
1999), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3c2b3f844.html.
122. Detention of Refugees and Asylum Seekers, Office of the United Nations High
Comm'r for Refugees, 41st Sess., Jan. 13 1987, 128(b), U.N. Doc. 12A (A/41/12/Add.1)
(1987).
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Comparatively few states have taken any formal steps to
incorporate the exemption from penalties required by
Article 31 . . . Even where legislative provisions exist,
however, refugees and asylum seekers can still face loss
of liberty. They are subject to the same law as is applied
to non-nationals generally, and are thus exposed to
prosecution, punishment, and/or detention, on account of
illegal entry, entry without documents, or entry without
falsified documents. 123
His conclusion reflects the RC's relative lack of enforcement apparatus,
as does the contestation over the scope of Article 26 of the RC.
C. European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
In contrast to the ICCPR, the ECHR enumerates a finite list of
specific grounds of permitted detention, including two forms of
immigration detention.124 Article 5(1)(f) permits detention "to prevent . .
. unauthorised entry into the country" and "of a person against whom
action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition."125 Both
123. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 119, at 226.
124. Article 5(1) provides:
No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and
in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent
court;
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with
the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any
obligation prescribed by law;
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of
bringing him before the competent legal authority of reasonable
suspicion of having committed and offence or when it is reasonably
considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing
after having done so;
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of
educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of
bringing him before the competent legal authority;
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading
of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug
addicts, or vagrants;
(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an
unauthorized entry into the country or of a person against whom
action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 6, art. 5(1).
125. Id.
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forms of detention must be "in accordance with a procedure prescribed
by law."126
1. The Requirement of Legality
The requirement of legality, as is commonly the case under the
ECHR, refers not only to conformity with enacted domestic law, but also
entails rule of law criteria, particularly relating to the accessibility,
precision, and foreseeability of the standards and procedures governing
detention.127 On occasion, the requirement of legality encompasses more
general concerns relating to detention conditions, such as when
detention of vulnerable individuals or children is at issue. 128 "In
accordance with law" has a further, somewhat latent significance under
the ECHR: where the state has additional obligations under EU law and
potentially other international legal norms, these are liable to be
incorporated into the notion of "in accordance with law."129 Accordingly,
there is much potential to read other legal standards into the ECtHR's
rule of law conception.
The ECtHR frequently finds violations of Article 5(1) for lack of
adherence to rule of law criteria."s0 Some cases concern egregious
breaches of domestic law: in Riad & Idiab v. Belgium, the respondent
state kept the applicants in detention despite two domestic court
rulings to release them, rendering the detention unlawful under the
126. Articles 5(4) and (5) set out the right to have the lawfulness of detention tested
"speedily by a court" and to compensation for unlawful detention, respectively. ECHR,
supra note 4, art. 5(4)-(5). The procedural safeguard in Article 5(3) applies to those
arrested or detained under Article 5(1)(c), but not to those detained under Article 5(1)(f).
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 6, art. 5(3).
127. Amuur v. France, App. No. 19776/92, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 533, 559 (1996).
128. See Muskhadzhiyeva v. Belgium, App. No. 41442/07 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010),
http://www.echr.coe.intlechr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search
"Application Number 41442/07"). Mayeka v. Belgium, App. No. 13178/03 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2006), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink;
search "Application Number 13178/03').
129. In Mendizabal v. France, the ECtHR treated the EU right of residence of a Spanish
national in France as an aspect of its Article 8 ECHR legal patrimony. Mendizabal v.
France, App. No. 51431/99, 50 Eur. H.R. Rep. 50 (2006).
130. See Al-Agha v. Romania, App. No. 40933/02 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search
"Application Number 40933/02"); Soldatenko v. Ukraine, App. No. 2440/07 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2008), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink;
search "Application Number 2440/07"); John v. Greece, App. No. 199/05 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2007), http://www.echr.coe.intlechr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink;
search "Application Number 199/05"); Shamsa v. Poland, App. No. 45355/99 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2003), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink;
search "Application Number 45355/99").
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ECHR also.13' The ECtHR has found repeated serious infractions of
the requirement of legality by Turkey,132 Malta, 33 and Russia.134 The
ECtHR also scrutinizes conformity with domestic law with increasing
intensity, at times effectively finding that the domestic courts have
131. Riad v. Belgium, App. No. 29787/03 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 74-76 (2008),
http://www.echr.coe.intlechr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search
"Application Number 29787/03").
132. See Dbouba v. Turkey, App. No. 15916/09 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010),
http://www.echr.coe.intlechr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search
"Application Number 15916/09"); Tehrani v. Turkey, App. No. 32940/08 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2010), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink;
search "Application Number 32940/08"); Z.N.S. v. Turkey, App. No. 21896/08 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2010), http://www.echr.coe.intlechr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink;
search "Application Number 21896/08"); Abdolkhani v. Turkey, App. No. 30471/08 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2009), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink;
search "Application Number 30471/08"). Researcher Michael Flynn reports that 'Turkey
has refused to acknowledge, despite successive legal rulings against it, that its systematic
confinement of irregular migrants in so-called guesthouses amounts to deprivation of
liberty." Michael Flynn, Immigration Detention and Proportionality 8 (Global Detention
Project, Working Paper No. 4, 2001), available at http://www.globaldetentionproject.org/
fileadmin/publications/GDP detention.and.proportionality.workingpaper.pdf.
133. See Massoud v. Malta, App. No. 24340/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search
"Application Number 24340/08"); Kadem v. Malta, App. No. 55263/00 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003),
http://www.echr.coe.intlechr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search
"Application Number 55263/00"); Ali v. Malta, App. No. 35892/97 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search
"Application Number 35892/97"). Malta persists in automatically detaining asylum
seekers, notwithstanding these rulings. See Report by Thomas Hammarberg,
Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, Following His Visit to Malta
from 23 to 25 March 2011, CommDH(2011)17 (2011), https://wcd.coe.int/wcd/
ViewDoc.jsp?id=1797917 (prepared by Thomas Hammarberg).
134. See Sultanov v. Russia, App. No. 15303/09 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search
"Application Number 15303/09"); Iskandarov v. Russia, App. No. 17185/05 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2010), http://www.echr.coe.intlechr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink;
search "Application Number 17185/05"); Yuldashev v. Russia, App. No. 1248/09 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2010), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink;
search "Application Number 1248/09"); Isakov v. Russia, App. No. 14049/08 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2010), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink;
search "Application Number 14049/08"); Nolan v. Russia, App. No. 2512/04 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2009), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink;
search "Application Number 2512/04"); Muminov v. Russia, App. No. 42502/06 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2008), http://www.echr.coe.intlechr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink;
search "Application Number 42502/06"); Nasrulloyev v. Russia, App. No. 656/06 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2007), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink;
search "Application Number 656/06"); Garabayev v. Russia, App. No. 38411/02 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2007), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink;
search "Application Number 38411/02").
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erred in their application of domestic law. In Rusu v. Austria,35 the
Court ensured strict adherence with the necessity test in the
applicable domestic law, although the Court does not incorporate this
standard into its own requirements for Article 5(1)(f) detention.e36
Other cases push the notion of "lawfulness" even further. For instance,
in a case in which the decision to detain was ostensibly based on
national security concerns, the Court deemed the detention to be
unlawful as no specific allegations or charges were brought against the
applicants, nothwithstanding that the detention was authorized under
published law.'37 In Lokpo & Tourd v. Hungary,138 the detention of
asylum seekers was deemed unlawful due to the authority's failure to
make a reasoned decision to continue detention: mere acquiescence
("non-action"139 or "mere silence"140) in the continued detention was
deemed insufficient to meet the requirement of legality.141 Although
the legislation in question was adopted to give effect to the EU PD, the
ECtHR did not take the opportunity to condemn the detention as
unlawful, even though it appeared to violate the EU measure's
135. Rusu v. Austria, App. No. 34082/02, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R (2008), http://www.echr.coe.intJ
echrlen/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search "Application Number 34082/02").
For a discussion, see MOLE & MEREDITH, supra note 63, at 158-61. For an intense review of the
application of domestic law, see Jusic v. Switzerland, App. No. 4691/06 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010),
http/www.echr.coe.intlechr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search
"Application Number 4691/06").
136. See infra Part II.C.2.
137. See Al-Agha v. Romania, App. No. 40933/02 Eur. Ct. H. R. (2010), http://
www.echr.coe.intlechr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search "Application
Number 40933/02"); Ahmed v. Romania, App. No. 34621/03 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search
"Application Number 34621/03"). In both rulings, the Court emphasized that national security
grounds needed particular safeguards against abuse, in particular to ensure effective judicial
protection, lest "sous le couvert de ddfendre la ddmocratie, de telles mesures risquent de la saper,
voire de la detruire." Al-Agha, 1 90 ("under the guise of defending democracy, these measures
risk undermining it, even destroying it"); see also Ahmed, 33, (quoting Rotaru v. Romania,
App. No. 28341/95 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000), httpJ/www.echr.coe.intlechr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC
database" hyperlink; search "Application Number 28341/95")).
138. Lokpo v. Hungary, App. No. 10816/10, 16-24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011),
http://www.echr.coe.intlechr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search
"Application Number 10816/10").
139. Id. para 23.
140. Id. para 24.
141. But cf. id. (Jodiene & Bjargvinsson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court had
strayed too far into the interpretation of national law, and that the continued detention
should be assumed to be on the same grounds as the initial one-and if there was a deficit
of judicial scrutiny, this might have been raised as an issue under Article 5(4) ECHR but
had not been).
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requirement that detention not be for the "sole reason"142 that the
applicants were asylum seekers.
2. Predeportation Detention-the Rejection of a Test of 'Reasonable
Necessity'
The leading case on predeportation detention is Chahal v. U.K.143
The Court stated in Chahal, and has reiterated since, that Article 5(1)(f)
"does not demand that the detention of a person against whom action is
being taken with a view to deportation be reasonably considered
necessary, for example to prevent his committing an offence or
fleeing."144 The only requirement was that the individual face
deportation. Whether the underlying decision to expel could be justified
under national or ECHR law was also deemed immaterial for the
purposes of Article 5(1)(f).145 Having rejected the criterion of "reasonable
necessity," the Court asserted that detention was only lawful as long as
deportation proceedings were in progress and prosecuted with "due
diligence."146 Strikingly, the Court held that detention while the asylum
claim was still being assessed fell under Article 5(1)(f).147 By thirteen
votes to six, it found no violation of Article 5(1), but unanimously found
a violation of Article 5(4), as the domestic courts were unable to conduct
a proper review due to the national security constraints on them.
The Court is increasingly insistent that states demonstrate that
deportation must be a realistic prospect. If removal is not feasible due to
the absence of travel documents, for example, detention will not be
justified. 148 The most recent Grand Chamber ruling on this matter, A. &
Others v. U.K,149 concerned the detention of foreign terrorist suspects.
The Court accepted that they were nonremovable under the ECHR
142. PD, supra note 8, art. 18(1).
143. Chahal v. United Kingdom, App. No. 22414/93, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413 (1997).
144. Id. para. 112.
145. Id.
146. See id. para. 113; see also Quinn v. France, App. No. 18580/91, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep.
529, para. 48 (1995); Singh v. Czech Republic, App. No. 60538/00, para. 61 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2005), (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search "Application Number 60538/00")
(offering more recent applications of "due diligence" criterion).
147. See Chahal paras. 115-16.
148. See Ali v. Switzerland, App. No. 24881/94, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 304, para. 12 (1998);
see also Mikolenko v. Estonia, App. No. 10664/05, para. 10 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search
"Application Number 10664/05"); Raza v. Bulgaria, App. No. 31465/08, paras. 11, 16 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (2010), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database"
hyperlink; search "Application Number 31465/08").
149. A. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 3455/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009) http://www.echr.coe.int/
echr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search "Application Number 3455/05").
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standards, due to human rights concerns in their countries of origin.
Nonetheless, the United Kingdom sought to justify their detention
under Article 5(1)(f) as it was keeping the possibility of removal "under
active review." 50 The Court rejected the United Kingdom's argument,
as this review was not "sufficiently certain or determinative to amount
to 'action . . . being taken with a view to deportation."'s15 The Grand
Chamber distinguished Chahal, stating that the earlier case
proceedings were being "actively and diligently pursued" in order to
determine whether removal would violate Article 3 of the ECHR.152 In
contrast, in A & Others, the proceedings concerned the legality of
detention, the prohibition of deportation having been conceded.153
The position of asylum seekers is precarious. It is arguable that in
order to comply with the RC's and the ECtHR non-refoulement
guarantees, they cannot be removed until their claims have been fully
examined, and so should be regarded as temporarily lawfully present.
Where domestic law reflects this position, the Court has held that
asylum seekers are not lawfully in predeportation detention, as is seen
in S.D. v. Greece and R.U. v. Greece.154 These cases are in tension with
Chahal because, in the earlier case, the period in detention as an
asylum seeker was deemed to be lawful predeportation detention.155 As
yet, as discussed in the next section, the Court has shied away from
insisting that, as a matter of ECHR law, asylum seekers are not in
predeportation detention, as they are temporarily authorized entrants.
3. Deportation to Prevent Unauthorized Entry: Statism Writ Large
Article 5(1)(f) also permits detention to prevent unauthorized entry.
The leading case is Saadi v. U.K.1 6 The applicant was an Iraqi doctor
150. Id. para. 167.
151. Id.
152. See id. para. 169.
153. See id. paras. 169-70.
154. See S.D. v. Greece, App. No. 53541/07, para. 62 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), http://
www.echr.coe.intlechr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search "Application
Number 53541/07') (referring specifically to the fact that national law precluded detention
unless the deportation was executable); see also R.U. v. Greece, App. No. 2237/08, paras. 95-96
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011), http//www.echr.coe.intlechr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database"
hyperlink; search "Application Number 2237/08") (noting that both national law and the RC
prevented removal and that, accordingly, the detention was not lawful under domestic law).
155. See also Lokpo v. Hungary, App. No. 10816/10, para. 16 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011),
http://www.echr.coe.intlechr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search
"Application Number 10816/10") (noting that it was common ground between the parties
that the applicants, although asylum seekers, were being detained with a view to
deportation).
156. Saadi v. United Kingdom, App. No. 13229/03, 47 Eur. H.R. Rep. 17 (2008). See
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who claimed asylum on arrival to the United Kingdom at Heathrow
Airport. At that point, he was temporarily released and requested to
return to the airport immigration authorities. He complied with the
request, and four days later was detained and transferred to a detention
center. The real reason for detention, in fact the entire institutional
rationale for the particular detention center, was to facilitate fast-track
processing of claims. 157
The central premise of the majority in the Grand Chamber was that
detention of those whose entry had not been authorized was a
"necessary adjunct" to "undeniable sovereign right to control aliens
entry into and residence in their territory."15 8 This "necessary adjunct"
imports the statist assumption into detention practices. The Court also
imported Chahal's rejection of a necessity test. The next move in the
reasoning places asylum seekers and other migrants in a legally naked
position: until a state has formally authorized entry, "any entry [is]
'unauthorized."'159 Accordingly, the detention of anyone seeking entry
who did not yet have the requisite authorization fell under Article
5(1)(f).so However, the Court was at pains to stress that the state did
not dispose of an open-ended right to detain, and so it tailored four
context-specific requirements to avoid arbitrariness. Detention must be
(1) carried out in good faith; (2) closely connected to the purpose of
preventing unauthorized entry of the person; (3) in an appropriate place
and under appropriate conditions bearing in mind that detainee has not
"committed criminal offences" but rather may have fled fearing for his
life; and (4) the length of the detention should not exceed that
reasonably required for the purpose pursued.' 6 Applying these criteria
to the facts, the majority held that seven days in a "specifically adapted"
place of detention was not arbitrary, in light of the difficult
administrative problems that confronted the United Kingdom during
the period in question.162
generally Violeta Moreno Lax, Beyond SAADI v UK- The "Necessity" Requirement for
Administrative Detention of Asylum Seekers in the EU, (Reflexive Governance in the Pub.
Interest, Working Paper No. REFGOV-FR-31 2010), available at http://refgov.cpdr.ucl.ac.bel
?go=publications&dc=561a56161f4c3720ba64e53b6bf6ea61d4ee4a84; Helen O'Nions, No
Right to Liberty: The Detention ofAsylum Seekers for Administrative Convenience, 10 EUR. J.
MIGRATION & L. 149 (2008).
157. See Saadi paras. 23-25.
158. See id. para. 64 (citing Amuur v. France, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 533, 556-57, para. 43
(1996); Chahal v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413, 454-55, para. 73 (1996);
Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 471, 497-98, paras. 67-68 (1985)).
159. See id. para. 65.
160. See id.
161. Id. para. 74.
162. See id. para. 80.
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The partly dissenting opinion of Judges Rozakis, Tulkens, Kovier,
Hajiyev, Spielmann, and Hirvela set out powerful counterarguments,
which urge greater fidelity to other IHRL standards. First, they noted
that the majority failed to distinguish between different categories of
migrants, subjecting them all to the "[s]tates' unlimited sovereignty." 63
The dissenters viewed the majority's treatment of detention as the
adjunct of sovereign entry control as sitting "uncomfortably with the
principle that asylum seekers who have presented a claim for
international protection are ipso facto lawfully within the territory of a
State . . . ."164 It should be noted that the majority and the minority cite
the HRC for authority of this proposition.165 Dismissing the notion of a
statist carte blanche to deem any entry unauthorized, they found that in
the particular case it had "in no sense been established in the present
case, as the applicant did not enter or attempt to enter the country
unlawfully."166 On this point, the dissenters are in a difficult position,
because if they deem all asylum seekers to be lawful entrants in all
circumstances, then the state has no power to detain them under Article
5(1)(f). In a deft move then, the suggestion is that asylum seekers be
treated as having a purpose-specific temporary admission. Accordingly,
while it is not permissible to detain "refugees on the sole ground that
they have made a claim for asylum," where evidence exists that they
may abscond before the claim is determined, then detention would be
permissible. In contrast, the United Kingdom's detention of Saadi was
explicitly for the purpose of making the asylum determination process
more efficient. The dissenters deemed that rationale improper, in terms
worth setting out in full:
[N]ot just in the context of asylum but also in other
situations involving deprivation of liberty, to maintain
that detention is in the interests of the person concerned
appears to us an exceedingly dangerous stance to adopt.
Furthermore, to contend in the present case that
detention is in the interests not merely of the asylum
seekers themselves "but of those increasingly in the
queue" is equally unacceptable. In no circumstances can
163. See id. at para. 32 (Rozakis, Tulkens, Kovler, Hajiyev, Spielmann & Hirvela, J.,
dissenting).
164. Id. at para. 31.
165. See id. para. 32, 35 (citing U.N. Human Rights Comm., Celepli v. Sweden,
Commc'n No. 456/1991, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/456/1991 (1994).
166. See id. at para. 33 (Rozakis, Tulkens, KovIer, Hajiyev, Spielmann and Hirvela, J.,
dissenting).
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the end justify the means; no person, no human being
may be used as a means towards an end. 167
Under the majority's approach, the asylum seeker "becomes an object
rather than a subject of law."168
On the application of the test to the facts, they further questioned
how to determine how long detention might last: If seven days was
reasonable, "where and how do we draw the line for what is
unacceptable?" 6 9 The dissenters also took issue with the failure to
examine alternatives to detention as part of the nonarbitrariness
assessment.170
Of central interest for present purposes is the approach of the
minority to IHRL more generally. The minority also noted that the
ECHR "[does] not apply in a vacuum,"171 setting out the key HRC
jurisprudencel 72 and EU norms, noting that Article 18(1) of the PD,
precluding detention for the "sole reason" of being a refugee, should be
regarded as "the minimum guarantee."173 On the majority's lack of
fidelity to the other international standards, described as the "crux of
the matter," the minority opinion ends with the following stinging
rebuke:
Ultimately, are we now also to accept that Article 5 [of
the ECHR], which has played a major role in ensuring
controls of arbitrary detention, should afford a lower
level of protection as regards asylum and immigration
which, in social and human terms, are the most crucial
issues facing us in the years to come? Is it a crime to be
a foreigner? We do not think so.
The Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly criticized the Saadi
judgment. First, the interpretation of "unauthorized entry" meant that
the state could detain "ad infinitum." 174 Secondly, it was in "blatant
conflict" with the UNHCR guidelines on detention in allowing detention
throughout the entire asylum process.176 The Parliamentary Assembly's
167. Id.




172. See id. at paras. 34-35.
173. See id. at para. 35.
174. See MENDONQA, supra note 2, at 19.
175. Id.
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Rapporteur called on the Court to reexamine its case law "taking fully
into account other international sources of law and views of the
international community."176
Since Saadi, the Court has come back to the issue of detention to
prevent unauthorized entry only once, in Rusu v. Austria.'77 As outlined
above, in Rusu the detention was deemed arbitrary mainly due to the
failure to adhere to the Austrian domestic legal standards, in particular
its necessity test. However, the Court also emphasized that it was
implausible on the facts to treat the applicant as attempting to
effectuate an unauthorized entry, when she was in fact trying to leave
Austria. This ruling may signal a more intense judicial review of both
adherence to domestic standards and the factual matrix surrounding
the claim of unauthorized entry.178
4. Assessment of the Strasbourg Case Law
Overall, the case law is predominantly concerned with legality
criteria. Certainly, this preoccupation reflects in part the types of
violations coming before the ECtHR, wherein states have internalized
the statist assumption, and erroneously regarded their own prerogatives
as not requiring legal authority in the normal sense. Yet, it also reflects
a choice on the part of the ECtHR to emphasize the domestic protection
of rights. However, without clear ECtHR review of the purposes and
necessity of detention, domestic law and rule of law criteria may offer
little protection in practice.
The two weak points in the Strasbourg case law are the approach to
the determination of "unauthorized entry" and the loose nexus required
between deportation and detention. On the former, the notion of the
state's carte blanche to authorize entry is also ill fitting when legal
authority is exercised at different levels. The RC, and the EU law giving
effect to it, clearly envisages asylum seekers as temporarily authorized
entrants, as are many other categories of individuals who enjoy rights of
entry and residence under EU law. For a court of IHRL to ignore these
obligations is to treat states as plenipotentiaries over a matter that they
176. Id. at 21.
177. See Rusu v. Austria, App. No. 34082/02, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 28 (2009).
178. See MOLE & MEREDITH, supra note 63, at 151 (pointing out that Rusu is a Chamber
judgment delivered by seven judges, four of whom had been dissenters in Saudi v. United
Kingdom, and two of whom had voted with the majority); see also CORNELISSE, supra note
15, at 312 (suggesting that this "one case" where the court closely analyzed the
proportionality of the detention was striking in that it concerned "a person who was not at
all 'out of place' in the global territorial ideal, but instead on her way back to the country
where she 'belonged").
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have already ceded discretion. Strasbourg moved in the right directive
in R. U. v. Greece'79 and S.D. v. Greece, 1so but regrettably did not engage
with the question of EU standards in Lokpo & Tourd v. Hungary.181
On the deportation-detention nexus, by rejecting the necessity test,
the Court explicitly sets a lower standard of protection for immigration
detention than for other forms.182 The "necessary adjunct" construct in
fact allowed states to transplant the degree of discretion they
(putatively) disposed of over admission to the territory to another
domain, detention. It would be appropriate for the ECtHR to take a
prompt from the HRC jurisprudence and EU norms, and read
requirements of necessity and proportionality into Article 5(1)(f).
Normally under the ECHR, rights restrictions must be proportionate, 83
meaning that the restriction must be suitable to achieve the particular
legitimate aim. Thus necessary and proportionate are used in the strict
sense, which involves examining alternative less rights-intrusive
means. Such is the "ubiquity of proportionality analysis" 84 that some
defend as the central principle of human rights adjudication. 85 Without
necessarily endorsing that view, for the ECtHR to be textually faithful
to Article 5, the ECHR requires it to insist on finite permissible grounds
for detention. But the failure to insist on the appropriate demonstrable
link between the detention in question and the ground in question (be it
to effectuate deportation or to prevent unauthorized entry) undermines
the textual commitment to limit detention to specified grounds.
179. R.U. v. Greece, App. No. 2237/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011), http://www.echr.coe.int/
echr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search "Application Number
2237/08").
180. S.D. v. Greece, App. No. 53541/07 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011), http://www.echr.coe.int/
echr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search "Application Number
53541/07').
181. Lokpo v. Hungary, App. No. 10816/10 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011), http://www.echr.coe.int/
echr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search "Application Number
10816/10").
182. See CORNELISSE, supra note 15, at 279, 305-08 (comparing case law under Article
5(1)(e), which concerns "the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading
of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts, or vagrants,"
with that of Article 5(1)(f)); see also CLARE OVEY & ROBIN WHITE, JACOBS & WHITE:
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 133 (2002).
183. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 6, art. 8-11. Admittedly, there
is often a textual basis, as the restrictions in question must be "necessary in a democratic
society" under the relevant Treaty Article. However, the principle is built into the
structure of analysis beyond those provisions as well.
184. Mattias Kumm, The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification:
The Point of Rights-Based Proportionality Review, 4 LAw & ETHICS HUM. RTs. 140, 142
(2010).
185. See DAVID BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW 187 (2004). See generally ROBERT
ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (2002).
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Constructive human rights pluralism is evident in the minority
opinion in Saadi. The minority opinion shows that appropriate
engagement with the external standards of the HRC and RC, would
have led to a different result. Strasbourg's failure to engage with the
ICCPR standards in all of its immigration detention cases is striking.186
D. EU Law
The EU legislation governing immigration detention takes the form
of directives. These are binding norms that envisage further legislative
implementation by the Member States.187 However, once the
implementation date prescribed has passed, individuals may invoke
those provisions of the directive that are sufficiently clear and precise.188
This doctrine of direct effect allows individuals to invoke the
unimplemented Directive against the state but not vice versa.189 Once
an EU directive's implementation date has passed, individuals and their
lawyers will have no hesitation to invoke those of its provisions that
may be beneficial.o90 This helps explain how even an apparently
repressive measure like the RD, discussed below, produces cases that
are protective of migrants' rights, at least when Member States are
dilatory in implementation. Given EU law's strong normative punch,
186. See Ian Bryan & Peter Langford, The Lawful Detention of Unauthorised Aliens
Under the European System for the Protection of Human Rights, 80 NORDIC J. OF INT'L L.
193, 203-04 (2011).
187. See TFEU supra note 7, art. 228.
188. Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337 (describing the doctrine of
"vertical direct effect").
189. The opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Joined Cases C-152-
154/07, Arcor v. Germany, 2008 E.C.R. 1-5959, para. 98 accurately captures the legal
position:
The doctrine of direct effect operates on a vertical, one-way plane (from
an individual to the State), in that traffic in the opposite direction
(reverse vertical relationships) (citing Joined Cases C-74/95 and C-
129/95 X, 1996 E.C.R. 1-6609) and perpendicular routes which would
enable a directive to be relied on between individuals (horizontal direct
effect) are both prohibited. (citing Case 152/84, Marshall v.
Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority,
1986 E.C.R. 723).
See also, Case C-61/11 PPU, Hassen El-Dridi alias Karim Soufi, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex
CELEX LEXIS 1027, para. 28 (Apr. 28, 2011) (view of Advocate General JAn MazAk).
190. See, e.g., Serge Slama, Le Noel Des Sans-Papiers: invoquez directement la directive
"retour" et la charte des droits fondamentaux..., COMBATS POUR LES DROITS DE L'HOMME
(CPDH) BLOG (Dec. 26, 2010), http://combatsdroitshomme.blog.lemonde.fr/les-suites-du-
noel-des-sans-papiers-invocabilite-de-la-directive-retour-du-16-decembre-2008-depuis-le-
24-decembre-2010/. The title "Le No6l des sans-papiers" (The Christmas of Undocumented
Migrants) refers to the RD's implementation date of December 24, 2010. After that time,
migrants could invoke the RD against the State.
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national governments that form part of the main EU legislative body
are loath to commit to legislative norms that will constrain them
excessively. Yet, the combination of terse laconic norms and strong
judicial enforcement may have unanticipated consequences for national
executives.
1. Detention of Asylum Seekers
Both the RCD191 and PD192 make references to detention. In
addition, the EU is currently revising the Dublin Regulation to include
detention rules. 93 At present, the Regulation does not contain any
provisions on detention, but in practice it is seen to have contributed to
the increase in detention of asylum seekers across Europe, as it
increases the cohort of asylum seekers who are amenable to removal
before the claims have been processed.194
The original proposal for the RCD contained a detailed provision on
detention, largely modeled on Executive Committee Conclusion Number
44.195 However, negotiating wrangles produced oblique, piecemeal
provisions instead. Article 7 of the RCD provides that "[a]sylum seekers
may move freely within the territory of the host Member States."
However, Member States may decide on "the residence of the asylum
seeker for reasons of public interest, public order, or, when necessary, for
the swift processing and effective monitoring of his or her application." 96
This provision seems to fall far short of Article 26 of the RC.197
191. RCD, supra note 9.
192. PD, supra note 8. For analysis of both, see Dan Wilsher, Immigration Detention
and the Common European Asylum Policy, in WHOSE FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE?:
EU IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM LAw AND POLICY 395, 418-25 (Annelise Baldaccini et al.
eds., 2007); Kay Hailbronner, Detention of Asylum Seekers 9 EUR. J. OF MIGRATION & L.
159, 169 (2007).
193. Council Regulation 343/2003, supra note 47. The recast proposal contains a new
provision (Article 27) on detention. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining
the Member State Responsible for Examining an Application for International Protection
Lodged in One of the Member States by a Third-Country National or a Stateless Person
(Recast), at 48, COM (2008) 820 final (Mar. 12, 2008).
194. For some qualitative evidence, see Dublin II: A Summary of JRS Experiences in
Europe, JESUIT REFUGEE SERV. (Oct. 2008), www.jrseurope.org/AdvocacyPages/
Dublin%20Regulation/DublinSummaryJRSResponsesFinal.pdf.
195. See generally U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Exec. Comm., No. 44 Detention of
Refugees and Asylum-Seekers (1986), http://www.unher.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/
opendocPDFViewer.html?docid=4aa764389&query-detention%20of%2refugees%20and%20
asylum-seekers%20no.%2044; see also, Wilsher, supra note 192, at 422.
196. RCD, supra note 9, art. 7(2).
197. Marx, supra note 116, at 1163-64.
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On detention stricto sensu, Article 18(1) of the PD states plainly
that detention should not be for the sole reason that the individual is an
applicant for asylum. 198 Article 7(3) of the RCD states that "[w]hen it
proves necessary, for example for legal reasons or reasons of public
order, Member States may confine an applicant to a particular place in
accordance with their national law." 199 Here we find the necessity
criterion that is absent in the Strasbourg case law.200 However, the
guarantee is undermined by the vague open-ended grounds expressed
as, "for example for legal reasons or reasons of public order." The
vagueness of these grounds sits uneasily with the approach of the HRC,
in particular. The border procedures provision in Article 15(4) of the PD
seems to envisage confinement of asylum seekers at the border for a
prolonged period of up to four weeks, detention in all but name.
The provisions are replete with transformative potential. The PD
recognizes the right of the asylum seeker to be on the territory of the
Member States.201 On this basis alone, it seems difficult for an EU
Member State to treat asylum seekers' presence as unauthorized; at the
very least the approach of the minority in Saadi would have to be
applied. Similarly, asylum seekers could not be normally regarded as in
predeportation detention, following the approach in R. U. v. Greece and
S.D. v. Greece.202 The remaining leeway to detain asylum seekers is
198. Article 18 provides:
"1. Member States shall not hold a person in detention for the sole reason that he/she is an
applicant for asylum. 2. Where an applicant for asylum is held in detention, Member
States shall ensure that there is a possibility of speedy judicial review." PD, supra note 8,
at 23.
199. RCD, supra note 9, art. 7(3).
200. See generally Lax, supra note 156.
201. See PD, supra note 8, at 18 ("Applicants shall be allowed to remain in the Member
State, for the sole purpose of the procedure, until the determining authority has made a
decision in accordance with the procedures at first instance set out in Chapter III. This
right to remain shall not constitute an entitlement to a residence permit.") See also
Council Directive 2008/115, 2008 O.J. (L 348) 98 (EC). ("In accordance with [the PD] a
[TCN] who has applied for asylum in a Member State should not be regarded as staying
illegally on the territory of that Member State until a negative decision on the application,
or a decision ending his or her right of stay as asylum seeker has entered into force"). The
PD appears to leave it to Member States to decide whether there is a right to remain
pending resolution of any appeals or reviews of first instance decisions. However, the case
law of the ECtHR requires suspensive effect of appeals to vindicate Articles 3 (where such
risks pertain) and 13 ECHR. See Gebremedhin v France, App. No. 25389/05, T 34 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2007), http://www.echr.coe.intlechr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink;
search "Application Number 25389/05"). See also Thomas Spijkerboer, Subsidiarity and
'Arguability? The European Court of Human Rights' Case Law on Judicial Review in
Asylum Cases 21 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 48, 69-73 (2009).
202. See S.D. v. Greece, App. No. 53541/07 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), http://www.echr.coe.int/
echr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search "Application Number
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accordingly diminished, and would require some infraction on the part
of the individual asylum seeker in order to render her stay
unauthorized. Even in that instance, the detention would need to be
demonstrated as a necessary means to achieve the particular legitimate
aim in view. Proportionality, encompassing the three elements of
suitability, necessity, and least restrictive means, is a ubiquitous
feature of EU law.203 The building blocks for a new, more rigorous
adjudicatory framework are contained in these terse rules. Whether
that potential is exploited depends largely on suitably crafted references
from national courts coming before the CJEU.
2. Predeportation Detention and the CJEUKadzoev and El Dridi
Rulings
The RD sets out rules governing the conditions and procedures for
the return (i.e., deportation) of illegal TCNs.204 Once a Member State
deems someone "illegal" the RD sets out "a horizontal set of rules,
applicable to all [TCNs] who do not or who no longer fulfill the
conditions for entry, stay or residence in a Member State."205 Like the
asylum directives, it took prolonged negotiations to reach agreement on
the RD, though involving the European Parliament as a colegislator. 206
Some of the standards in the RD are lamentably low, prompting a
broad-based international campaign against its adoption, during which
53541/07"); see also R.U. v. Greece, App. No. 2237/08 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search
"Application Number 2237/08").
203. Proportionality is a general principle of EU law. In addition, the EUCFR contains a
general limitation clause in Article 52(1). See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union, supra note 57, art. 52(1) (stating, "Any limitation on the exercise of the
rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect
the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality,
limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of
general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of
others" (emphasis added)).
204. For detailed analysis, see Anneliese Baldaccini, The Return and Removal of
Irregular Migrants Under EU Law: An Analysis of the Returns Directive, 11 EUR. J.
MIGRATION & L. 1 (2009). See also Anneliese Baldaccini, The EU Directive on Return:
Principles and Protest, 28 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 114 (2010); Martin Schieffer, Chapter V
Termination of Residence, in EU IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM LAw: COMMENTARY ON EU
REGULATIONS AND DIRECTIVES (Kai Hailbronner ed., 2010).
205. Council Directive 2008/115, supra note 201, at 98.
206. See generally Diego Acosta, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly in EU Migration Law:
Is the European Parliament Becoming Bad and Ugly?, 11 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 19
(2009) (discussing the different steps in the adoption of the Directive); see also FABIAN
LUTZ, THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE RETURN DIRECTIVE: COMMENTS AND MATERIALS (2010).
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it was condemned as a "shameful" and "outrageous" measure. 207 The
eighteen-month outer time limit for detention has been the focus of the
most criticism. 208 While Member States are not obliged to permit such
long detention, in practice several have increased detention times in
implementing the Directive. 209 Further, reentry bans reinforce the
impression of a repressive measure.210
Yet, the RD integrates human rights principles, 211 in particular the
principle of proportionality. 212 It aims to encourage voluntary return, so
the coercive moves to detain and deport may only be engaged after a
waiting period. 213 The preamble cites the Council of Europe's Twenty
Guidelines on Forced Return. 214 Concerning detention, Recital 16
provides:
207. See, e.g., No to the Outrageous Directive, www.statewatch.org/news/2007/dec/eu-
returns-ngo-compilation.pdf (document prepared by 14 European pro-migrant NGOs,
subsequently supported by 400 European organizations and more than 8,000 citizens); see
also Press Release, European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), Returns Directive:
EU Fails to Uphold Human Rights (June 18, 2008), http://www.ecre.org/files/
ECRE%20press%20release%2OReturns%20Dir.pdf; U.N. High Comm'r. for Refugees,
UNHCR Position on the Proposal for a Directive on Common Standards and Procedures in
Member States for Returning Illegally Staying Third-Country Nationals (June 16, 2008),
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4856322c2.pdf; Press Release UN Experts Express
Concern About Proposed EU Return Directive, UN Press Release (July 18, 2008).
208. See, e.g., EUR. PARL. Ass. DEB. 7th Sess. para. 5 (Jan. 28, 2010) ("The European
Union Return Directive, which provides for a maximum length of detention for irregular
migrants of up to eighteen months, can be criticised for adopting the lowest common
standard with regard to length of detention ... and increasing the possibility for states to
increase their minimum duration of detention."). See generally Report of the Working
Group on Arbitrary Detention, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/30 (Jan. 18, 2010).
209. See Michael Flynn & Cecilia Cannon, Detention at the Borders of Europe: Report on
the Joint Global Detention Project, GLOBAL DETENTION PROJECT, Oct. 2-3, 2010, at 5.
(stating "Greece, Italy, and Spain have all increased detention times since adopting the
Return Directive. A fourth country, Hungary, is set to double maximum detention terms
when newly adopted legislation enters into force at the end of 2010"). For a detailed
overview of detention time limits, see Fundamental Rights Agency, supra note 97, at 31-
35. On implementation more generally, see THE RETURNS DIRECTIVE: CENTRAL THEMES,
PROBLEM ISSUES, AND IMPLEMENTATION IN SELECTED MEMBER STATES (Karin Zwaan ed.,
2011).
210. See generally Council Directive 2008/115, supra note 201, art. 11. (explaining the
issuing of entry bans).
211. See id. at Recital 2 (referring to "full respect for ... fundamental rights and
dignity"); see also id. at Recital 24 (asserting that "[t]his Directive respects the
fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.").
212. See id. at Recitals 13, 16.
213. See id. at Recital 10, art. 7. The period envisaged is between seven and thirty days.
214. Id. at Recital 3. Twenty Guidelines on Forced Return, supra note 94. On many
contentious issues in the negotiations, the Twenty Guidelines provided compromise
solutions. See Schieffer, supra note 204, at 1506.
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The use of detention for the purpose of removal should
be limited and subject to the principle of proportionality
with regard to the means used and objectives pursued.
Detention is justified only to prepare the return or carry
out the removal process and if the application of less
coercive measures would not be sufficient.
Article 15 requires that detention only be used as a last resort, for as
short a period as possible, with the specific purpose of preparing and
carrying out the return process and crucially for as long as it is
"necessary to ensure successful removal."215 Two specific purposes are
given as examples of when detention would be necessary: when there is
a risk of absconding, or when the individual concerned avoids or
hampers the preparation of return or of the removal process. Reflective
of the ECtHR case law, detention is only permissible "as long as removal
arrangements are in progress and executed with due diligence."216 In
the absence of a "reasonable prospect of removal," detention must cease.
Article 15's terms are clearly stricter than the ECtHR case law in
incorporating a necessity requirement.
The CJEU has given two rulings on the legality of predeportation
detention under the RD, Kadzoev, 217 and El-Dridi,218 both under its new
urgent preliminary reference procedure. 219
a. Kadzoev220
Kadzoev's prolonged detention in Bulgaria shows the sharp end of
EU detention practices. 221 At the time of the references, he had spent
215. Council Directive 2008/115, supra note 201, art. 15.
216. Id. art. 15(1).
217. Case C-357/09 PPU, Kadzoev, 2009 E.C.R. 1-11189.
218. See Case C-61/11 PPU, Hassen El-Dridi alias Karim Soufi, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex
CELEX LEXIS 1027 (Apr. 28, 2011).
219. See TFEU, supra note 7, art. 267 (stating, "[i]f such a question is raised in a case
pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State with regard to a person in custody,
the Court of Justice of the European Union shall act with the minimum of delay"); see also
Consolidated Version of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice (CJEU), art. 104b,
2010 O.J. (C 177) 1, 28. For a general discussion, see Catherine Barnard, The PPU: Is it
Worth the Candle? An Early Assessment, 34 EUR. L. REV. 281 (2009).
220. See generally Elitsa Mincheva, Case Report on Kadzoev, 30 November 2009, 12
EuR. J. MIGRATION & L. 361 (2010) (detailing the Kadzoev case).
221. Concerning Kadzoev's particular case, see Fear of Forcible Return/Fear of Torture or
Ill-Treatment, AMNESTY INT'L (Apr. 18, 2008), http://amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR15/
001/2008/en/90cdl485-0d65-1ldd-all4-e974alf25b3e/eurl5OOl2008eng.pdf. See also Report
of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 42-43, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/44/Add4 (Feb. 17, 2009) (by Manfred Nowak).
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thirty-four months in detention, despite bringing unsuccessful asylum
claims and judicial reviews in order to secure his release. The reference
arose when the domestic court was seized by a request from the
Directorate for Migration at the Ministry of the Interior requesting it to
rule ex officio on the legality of the duration of detention. The questions
referred concerned the temporal and material scope of Article 15 of the
RD in light of the particular facts of the case. The first two questions
concerned the determination of which periods were covered by the
prescribed maximum detention period. The first question concerned
periods predating the Directive's entry into force, while the second
question raised the crucial question of how the periods while asylum
applications were pending should be regarded. The third question
concerned periods when the execution of the removal was suspended
pending appeal. The fourth question went to the meaning of removal
being "reasonably possible," raising fact-specific concerns pertaining to
the noncooperation of the Russian authorities. The fifth and final
question asked what the Bulgarian authorities were to do if the
maximum detention period had passed and "there [was still] a doubt as
to [the applicant's] identity, he [was] aggressive in his conduct, he [had]
no means of supporting himself and there [was] no third person who has
undertaken to provide for his subsistence?"222
The specific answers may be summarized quickly: the period spent
in detention prior to the entry into force of the RD did count toward the
maximum period, when proceedings were ongoing after its entry into
force.223 Periods spent as an asylum seeker did not count toward the
period, as a separate regime addressed this issue, and, crucially, asylum
seekers were not "illegal," so they did not fall under the RD. If, however,
no specific decision had been taken to detain Kadzoev under the asylum
rules, the time under the RD would continue to run.224 Similarly,
periods in detention when deportation was suspended pending appeal
did count toward the RD time limit.225 The "reasonable prospect of
removal" meant a realistic prospect, which would not pertain if the
receiving country was unlikely to admit the individual within a
"reasonable period" (according to the Advocate General (AG)) 226 or the
period set out in the RD (according to the Court).227 Once the detention
Concerning detention practices in general in Bulgaria, see Valeria Ilareva, Bulgaria's
Treatment of Asylum Seekers, 29 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 60 (2007), available at
www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR29/60-61.pdf.
222. Case C-357/09 PPU, Kadzoev, 2009 E.C.R. 1-11189, para. 30.
223. Id. paras. 34-39.
224. Id. paras. 40-48.
225. Id. paras. 49-57.
226. Id. paras. 65-66.
227. Id.
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period was up, there was no further basis to detain the individual under
EU law, and immediate release was required, 228 notwithstanding the
facts the Bulgarian government sought to rely on.229 In a footnote, the
AG acknowledged the possibility of residual Member State competence
to detain "because of aggressive behaviour on the basis of national
legislation intended to maintain public order or the criminal law, for
example."230 The Court was silent on this crucial question of the extent
to which Member State action had been preempted by the RD.
b. El-Dridi
El-Dridi231 delves even more deeply into the immigration detention
practices of the Member State concerned, Italy, and raises precisely
those preemption questions that were left unanswered in Kadzoev.
Italy has been at the forefront of the criminalization of irregular
migration, a trend seen increasingly across Europe.232 Detention for
committing a crime is conceptually and legally distinct from
immigration detention, as Article 5 of the ECHR reflects. However,
immigrant populations increasingly fall foul of criminal laws specifically
designed to criminalize their presence. In Italy, it is a criminal offense
for a foreigner to remain in the country once a legal order to leave the
territory has been issued. 233 Although the Italian Constitutional Court
has tempered the strictness of the offense, the crime of illegal presence
remains. 234 Notably, the Italian Constitutional Court has recently
issued a number of rulings undermining some elements of the
repressive anti-immigrant legislation, known as the "security
package." 2 35 El-Dridi may be viewed as part of this process of judicial
228. Id. paras. 68-71.
229. Id. para. 71.
230. Id., n.38 (view of Advocate General Jdn MazAk). See also Galina Cornelisse,
Casenote on C-357/09 PPU, 48 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 925, 933 (2011).
231. See Case C-61/11 PPU, Hassen El-Dridi alias Karim Soufi, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex
LEXIS 1027 (Apr. 28, 2011).
232. See generally Council of Eur.: Comm'r for Human Rights, Criminalisation of
Migration in Europe: Human Rights Implications (Feb. 4, 2010), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b6a9fef2.html.
233. See El-Dridi, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 1027, para. 17 for the full text of the
synopsized provisions.
234. See Report of the WGAD, supra note 91, TT 57-67 for an extensive discussion of
both Italy's "extraordinary measures in the fight against crime by irregular migrants" and
immigration detention stricto sensu. The Italian Constitutional Court has reviewed this
law, and precluded its application in cases where noncompliance with the order to leave
was justified. See Cass., sez. un., 17 dicembre 2010, n. 359, (It.) (Case No. 359/2010).
235. All, bar one (Case C-144/11, Abdallah, 2011 O.J. (C 152) 17), have been terminated
in light of El-Dridi (see YASHA MAccANico, STATEWATCH ANALYSIS: ITALY - SERIES OF
295
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 19:1
action to constrain the states' immigration decrees. Italian judges sent a
raft of similar preliminary references on the topic. 236 The questions
referred merit setting out in full:
In the light of the principle of sincere cooperation, the
purpose of which is to ensure the attainment of the
objectives of the directive, and the principle that the
penalty must be proportionate, appropriate and
reasonable, do Articles 15 and 16 [RD] preclude:
-the possibility that criminal penalties may be imposed
in respect of a breach of an intermediate stage in the
administrative return procedure, before that procedure
is completed, by having recourse to the most severe
administrative measure of constraint which remains
available?
-the possibility of a sentence of up to four years'
imprisonment being imposed in respect of a simple
failure to cooperate in the deportation procedure on the
part of the person concerned, in particular where the
first removal order issued by the administrative
authorities has not been complied with?237
DEFEATS IN COURT FOR THE "SECURITY PACKAGE" (Statewatch, 2011), available at
www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-137-italy-security-package.pdf). See generally Italian
Constitutional Court, 25 July 2011, No. 245 (striking down a law restricting the right to
marry of irregular migrants); Italian Constitutional Court, 8 July 2010, No. 249 (striking
down a law imposing additional criminal penalties on irregular migrants); Italian
Constitutional Court, 4 Apr. 2011, Case No. 115 (striking down a law conferring excessive
powers on local government to combat irregular migration), available at
http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/actionPronuncia.do.
236. See Case C-43/11, Assane Samb, 2011 O.J. (C 113) 7; Case C-50/11, Lucky Emegor,
2011 O.J. (C 113) 7, 2011 O.J. (C 252) 28 (withdrawn); Case C-61/11, Mrad, 2011 O.J. (C
113) 8, 2011 O.J. (C 252) 28 (withdrawn); Case C-63/11, John Austine, 2011 O.J. (C 120) 5,
2011 O.J. (C 252) 28 (withdrawn); Case C-94/11, Survival Godwin, 2011 O.J. (C 139) 14,
2011 (C 252) 29 (withdrawn); Case C-113/11, Cherni, 2011 (C 238) 4 (withdrawn); Case C-
120/11, Yeboah Kwadwo, 2011 O.J. (C 145) 17 (removed from register); Case C-140/11,
Demba Ngagne, 2011 O.J. (C 152) 16, 2011 O.J. (C 252) 29 (removed from register); Case
C-156/11, Ibrahim Music, 2011 O.J. (C 269) 20 (removed from register); Case C-169/11,
Conteh, 2011 O.J. (C 173) 8 (removed from register); Case Case C-187/11, Vermisheva,
2011 (C 211) 11 (removed from register).
237. Case C-61/11 PPU, Hassen El-Dridi alias Karim Soufi, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS
1027, para. 25 (Apr. 28, 2011).
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The Italian government argued that its use of criminal law put the
detention outside the scope of the RD, relying on Article 2(2)(b). 238 In
one sentence, the Court rejected that plea.239 The AG clarified that the
exception only applied where the return obligation was applied as a
result of a criminal conviction. In the instant case, the return obligation
was the predicate act to the criminal offense, and so the exception was
not applicable. 240
The CJEU characterized the national legislation as providing for
detention "on the sole ground" that the migrant was in breach of the
order to leave 241 In contrast, the Court described the RD as establishing
a "fixed order" of "various, successive stages" of the removal process, 242
which must employ the "least coercive measures possible."24 3 Detention,
the "most serious constraining measure," was "strictly regulated" in
order to ensure observance of fundamental rights. 244 Having confirmed
the direct effect of Articles 15 and 16 of the RD,245 the CJEU identified
various ways in which "the removal procedure provided for by the
Italian legislation at issue in the main proceedings [was] significantly
different from that established by that directive."246 These differences
included the absence of a period for voluntary departure247 and the
recourse to criminal detention. 248
The CJEU reassured the Member States that they may still take
"[coercive] measures, including criminal law measures, aimed inter alia
at dissuading those nationals from remaining illegally on those States'
territory."249 However, those measures, even in the criminal law field,
must be adjusted to ensure compliance with EU law, 250 and ensure its
effectiveness. 251 The principles of proportionality and effectiveness
precluded any national rule that provided for a custodial sentence "on
the sole ground" that the TCN continued to stay illegally after the order
has been issued. Instead, Member States must "pursue their efforts to
238. Id. para. 49.
239. Id. paras. 48-49. At issue was the exclusion of those facing deportation for criminal
reasons under Article 2(2)(b) of the Returns Directive. See RD, supra note 10, art. 2(2)(b).
240. El-Dridi, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS .1027, paras 22-28.
241. Id. para. 29.
242. Id. para. 34.
243. Id. para 39.
244. Id. para. 42.
245. Id. paras. 44-47.
246. Id. para. 50.
247. Id. para. 51.
248. Id. paras. 52-60.
249. Id. para. 52.
250. Id. para. 54.
251. Id. paras. 55-56.
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enforce the return decision, which continues to produce its effects." 252
The CJEU noted that detention in this circumstance risked making
removal more difficult. 253
The result is startling: The RD precludes the Italian law. As EU law
is supreme over national law, national courts are obliged not to apply
those provisions of the Italian law which are incompatible with the RD,
taking into account the general principle "of the retroactive application
of the more lenient penalty."254 This duty, incumbent on all national
judges irrespective of their position in the national judicial hierarchy,
has been a hallmark of EU law since its early years. 255
3. The Looming Question of Preemption
EU law's capacity not only to penetrate the domestic legal order,
but also to shift aside other domestic norms and make way for its own
"full effectiveness" is truly distinctive. The question left unasked and
unanswered in Kadzoev is of great constitutional significance for the
relationship between the EU and its Member States. If Kadzoev can no
longer be detained under the RD, what residual power does the
Member State have detention-wise?256 El-Dridi takes up this issue in
regard to criminal detention. The AG and the CJEU are not ad idem
on the extent of preemption. The AG notably took issue with the
inherent nature of criminal law, described as a "repressive reaction."257
For the AG, both criminalization per se and detention as the specific
penalty were liable to impede the achievement of the RD's aim.258 In
contrast, the Court expressly leaves more leeway for national criminal
measures in this field. 25 9 Indeed, in emphasizing that the offending
252. Id. para. 58.
253. Id. para. 59.
254. Id. para. 61.
255. See Case 106/77, Simmenthal, 1978 E.C.R. 629.
256. This form of preemption, where the EU rules preempt national ones because the
latter impede the effectiveness of the former is "the most hazy and ill-defined" form of
preemption in EU law. Amedeo Arena, The Doctrine of Union Preemption in the EU Single
Market: Between Sein and Sollen 31 (The Jean Monnet Ctr. for Int'l and Reg'1 Econ. Law
& Justice, Working Paper 03/10, 2010). The other forms are field pre-emption (where EU
rules in the field preclude national action in that field) and rule pre-emption (where an
EU norm precludes a contradictory national one.) Arena's account focuses on pre-emption
in the context of the EU's single market. He notes in his conclusion that investigating the
"preemptive effects on EU legislation in the area of freedom, security and justice" is of
"paramount importance." Id. at 90.
257. Case C-61/11 PPU, Hassen El-Dridi alias Karim Soufi, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex CELEX
LEXIS 1027, para. 40 (Apr. 28, 2011).
258. Id. para. 43.
259. Id. para. 52.
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aspect of the Italian legislation was that detention was "on the sole
ground" of staying in the face of the order to leave, the CJEU seems to
implicitly allow for other criminal offenses based on illegal residence
coupled with some other elements of wrong-doing, provided that this
did not make deportation more difficult. The difference in approach
between the AG and the Court will require resolution shortly.260 While
the approach in El-Dridi seems capable of taming some of the punitive
excesses of the moves toward the criminalization of migration, it
brings a sense of disquiet too. If criminalization was demonstrated to
be effective in achieving deportation, then one would fall back on the
principle of proportionality alone to restrain it under EU law, in which
case the notion that the RD would preempt the national rules would be
a much more audacious claim.
As for the notion of residual "public order" detention powers, there
is certainly no general "public order" power to detain under Article 5
ECHR. The grounds for detention set out there are finite.261 The Court
has interpreted the potentially broadest ground, which permits
detention "to secure the fulfillment of an obligation prescribed by law"
narrowly, requiring a specific identifiable legal obligation in view.262
Even in times of emergency, detention powers must be exercised in a
nondiscriminatory fashion. Singling out foreigners for special forms of
detention, other than under Article 5(1)(f), is not permissible. This is
best illustrated by the rulings in the Belmarsh litigation saga,
culminating in the ECtHR Grand Chamber ruling in A. v. U.K 263
Nonetheless, many Member States do have anomalous detention
grounds that cannot be subsumed under the ECHR purposes, 264 and so
are of questionable legality under the ECHR. If such grounds impede
the effectiveness of the removal, the RD may also preclude them.
260. Case C-329/11 Alexandre Achughbabian v Pr6fet du Val-de-Marne, lodged on 29
June 2011.
261. For a discussion, see Fundamental Rights Agency, supra note 97, at 19.
262. Engel v. Netherlands, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 647 (1976).
263. A. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 3455/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009) http://www.echr.coe.int/
echr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search "Application Number 3455/05").
264. As the FRA has recently highlighted, in the Czech Republic, Finland, Greece,
Germany, and Hungary, additional reasons (such as the threat posed to public order) are
used to determine whether to place individuals in predeportation detention. The practices
are difficult to square with the requirement that detention be strictly necessary for the
purpose of effectuating removal. In other Member States (Latvia, Lithuania, and Malta),
public order and other non-Article 5 grounds, seem per se to justify detention of foreigners.
Fundamental Rights Agency, supra note 97, at 19-20.
299
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 19:1
4. CJEU-ECtHR Interactions
In Kadzoev, the reasoning of AG Mazik and of the Court are similar,
but, as is typically the case, the AG's View is more elaborate, particularly
in its engagement with the ECtHR authorities. In regard to the
"reasonable prospect of removal" under Article 15(4) of the RD, the AG
cited the Council of Europe material, in particular the CAHAR Guideline
Number Seven on Forced Return.265 The AG noted that EU law also
incorporated the Article 5(1)(f) ECHR standards, 266 citing Chahal267 and
Mikolenko.268 The AG emphasized the ECtHR requirement of due
diligence, in order to ensure that periods in detention are as short as
possible.269 The AG's view was decided on November 10, 2009, less than a
month after the ECtHR ruled in Mikolenko that detention was unlawful
as there was no reasonable prospect of removal. 270 Given the proximity in
time, it is unsurprising that the AG would cite this case, particularly
since both cases concern impediments to removal due to insufficient
cooperation from the receiving country. Unlike the Court, the AG gave a
strong indication that the detention should be regarded as unlawful in
the absence of a reasonable prospect of removal.
However, Kadzoev signals that the RD standards are higher than
the ECHR in other crucial respects, namely in requiring that detention
is necessary to effectuate removal, 271 and in imposing a strict time limit.
In El-Dridi, the Court noted that the RD was intended to take account
of both the Strasbourg case law "according to which the principle of
proportionality requires that the detention of a person against whom a
deportation or extradition procedure is under way should not continue
for an unreasonable length of time, that is, its length should not exceed
that required for the purpose pursued" and the guideline providing that
detention is to be "for as short a period as possible."272 In this way, the
265. Case C-357/09 PPU, Kadzoev, 2009 E.C.R. 1-11189.
266. Id. para. 53 (citing Chahal v. United Kingdom, App. No. 22414/93, 23 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 413 (1997); Mikolenko v. Estonia, App. No. 10664/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009),
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search
"Application Number 10664/05"); Twenty Guidelines on Forced Return, supra note 94
(Guideline No. 7)).
267. Chahal v. United Kingdom, App. No. 22414/93, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413 (1997).
268. Mikolenko v. Estonia, App. No. 10664/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), httpJ/www.echr.coe.intl
echr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search "Application Number 10664/05").
269. Case C-357/09 PPU, Kadzoev, 2009 E.C.R. 1-11189, para. 4.
270. Mikolenko, App. No. 10664/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009).
271. Case C-357/09 PPU, Kadzoev, 2009 E.C.R. 1-11189, para. 64.
272. See Case C-61/11 PPU, Hassen El-Dridi alias Karim Soufi, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex
LEXIS 1027, para. 43 (Apr. 28, 2011) (citing to Saadi v. United Kingdom, App. No.
13229/03, 47 Eur. H.R. Rep. 17, para. 72, para. 74 (2008); Twenty Guidelines on Forced
Return, supra note 94 (Guideline No. 8)).
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CJEU reads in the Strasbourg requirements as to the duration of
detention, making clear that the eighteen-month time limit is the outer
limit, which will not be justified in all cases. However, as we have seen,
the ECtHR rejects the requirements of necessity and proportionality in
its case law, but reads the requirement of "reasonable time" into its
conception of nonarbitrariness. It would be regrettable if the distinctive
EU version of proportionality were to be sapped of vigor by converging
on the weak ECHR non-arbitrariness standard.
The AG in Kadzoev also cited the Strasbourg case law to clarify that
although asylum seekers could not be detained under the RD,
"detention of an asylum applicant [was] not, as such, prohibited under
the international and [EU] law of asylum." 273 While the judgment is
crucially important in delimiting the detention of asylum seekers from
those facing deportation, it should not be taken to endorse the view that
the ECHR standards in Saadi274 should be incorporated into EU law in
toto. Rather, as demonstrated above, the EU legislative framework
contains the building blocks for more rigorous scrutiny of detention of
asylum seekers. Constructive human rights pluralism stands for critical
engagement, not automatic integration. The EU legislative framework
and its imminent commitment to rigorous proportionality review,
warrant a different approach.
CONCLUSION
The proliferation of rights sources and adjudicative bodies with
overlapping jurisdiction may give the appearance of a rights surfeit.
Yet, the cases reveal a burgeoning practice of immigration detention.
The HRC has used a vague, capacious notion of "arbitrariness" to
condemn automatic detention of migrants, instead demanding
individual justification. But, the permissible aims of detention remain
open under its jurisprudence. Regrettably, neither the ECtHR nor the
CJEU gives due weight to the HRC authorities. The ECtHR takes an
eccentric course, particularly in refusing to apply its standard
proportionality approach, and in allowing the state unlimited leeway to
deem migrants unauthorized. The two leading rulings, Chahal and
Saadi, sit poorly with the authority of the HRC and the RC, as well as
273. Case C-357/09 PPU, Kadzoev, 2009 E.C.R. 1-11189, para. 85 (citing, e.g., Saadi v.
United Kingdom, App. No. 13229/03, 47 Eur. H.R. Rep. 17 (2008); Riad v. Belgium, App. No.
29787/03 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 74-76 (2008), http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (follow
"HUDOC database" hyperlink; search "Application Number 29787/03 "); Human Rights
Comm., A. v. Australia, Commc'n. No. 560/1993, para. 9.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/56011993
(1997).
274. Saadi, App. No. 13229/03, 47 Eur. H.R. Rep. 17 (2008).
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with the standards now binding on the bulk of ECHR parties via EU
law. A necessity test and authorized presence at least for asylum
seekers once admitted to the procedure are acknowledged features of
the EU regime.
Constructive human rights pluralism would have Strasbourg engage
in a less perfunctory manner with the IHRL standards and align with
them, when appropriate. The existence of the EU standards should
exert pressure for that movement from within. EU law, despite the
apparently unpromising legislative framework, has integrated the
better aspects of the ECtHR jurisprudence, superimposing the necessity
requirement that the ECtHR erroneously rejected. Guiraudon's
prediction of the "bold" CJEU and the "tamer" ECtHR seems to be
playing out.275 It would be wrong for the EU to converge on the ECHR
minimum when it is called upon to articulate its own interpretation of
the right to liberty. Thus far, given the nature of the claims before it,
textual fidelity to the RD has produced outcomes that are evidently
more rights-protective than the ECHR. In future cases, it may be called
upon to develop its own distinctive jurisprudence on the right to liberty
and should be wary of the overblown statism that animates the
Strasbourg case law.
Much depends on national judges. They trigger preliminary
references, and their questions not only dictate the scope of the CJEU's
jurisdiction but may nudge the Luxembourg judges in particular
directions. While the referring court in Kadzoev seemed incredulous
that release from detention was required as a matter of EU law, the
questions referred in El-Dridi seem part of a concerted judicial effort to
thwart the criminalization of irregular migration in Italy. The Italian
government's argument in EI-Dridi, that its use of criminal law
prevented the application of the RD, has a naive ring to it. The outcome,
wherein the RD instead "precludes" the Italian law, shows that the
state qua EU Member no longer controls the exception. At the other end
of the enforcement spectrum, we might contrast the distortion of the
scope of the RC by governments keen to treat "asylum seekers" as
presumptively "bogus" rather than presumptive refugees. The article
began with the statist assumption, and the migrant's vulnerability to
naked state power. EU law takes a different view of the state,
unsettling statist assumptions, and opening up space for greater
normative contestation. The universal subject, the rights-bearer,
appears a more vivid prospect under EU law than under IHRL.
And yet, I have not described a continent at ease. Immigration
detention continues to increase, and Member States are raising
275. See Guiraudon, supra note 84.
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detention time limits in response to the RD. EU law brings us
"[d]etainees [who] have more rights, but they are detained for longer
periods of time" 276 But at least, once the maximum period of detention
expires, release is required. But then what? Once Kadzoev and El-Dridi
are released from detention, their irregular status remains. Periodic
mass regularizations of irregular migrants are routine in EU Member
States, 277 and increasingly justified in human rights terms.278 Mincheva
suggests the implicit next step for Kadzoev should be regularization. 279
Yet, EU law offers no solution at present and may even be seen to exert
an anti-regularization ethos over its Member States.280 The ECHR
protects some migrants from removal based on their long residence, but
does not provide them with a formal status in the host state.281 There is
no clear supranational legal remedy at present. It appears the best we
can hope for is that supranational courts and authority will prompt
inclusive political and judicial moves at the domestic level.
276. FLYNN & CANNON, supra note 2, at 9 (reporting the statement of an EU workshop
participant).
277. For an overview of regularization practices, see MARTIN BALDWIN-EDWARDS &
ALBERT KRALER, INT'L CTR. FOR MIGRATION POLICY DEV., REGINE: REGULARIZATIONS IN
EUROPE: STUDY ON PRACTICES IN THE AREA OF REGULARIZATION IN THE MEMBER STATES
OF THE EU-FINAL REPORT (2009).
278. See Albert Kraler, Fixing, Adjusting, Regulating, Protecting Human Rights-The
Shifting Uses of Regularisations in the European Union, 13 EUR. J. OF MIGRATION AND L.
297 (2011).
279. See Mincheva, supra note 220.
280. The problems posed by nonremovable irregular migrants have long been noted, but
even a suggestion to study the various Member State practices concerning nonremovable
migrants with a view to developing some common principles at the EU level was dropped.
Kraler, supra note 278, at 301.
281. See, e.g., Bonger v. The Netherlands, App. No. 10154/04 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005)
http://www.echr.coe.intlechr/en/hudoc (follow "HUDOC database" hyperlink; search
"Application Number 10154/04"). In rare cases, Article 8 ECHR may provide a basis for a
claim to regularize a migrant's stay. See generally Daniel Thym, Respect for Private and
Family Life Under Article 8 ECHR in Immigration Cases: A Human Right to Regularize
Illegal Stay?, 57 INT'L & COMp. L. Q. 87 (2008).
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